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An Institutional Theory of Corporate 
Regulation 
Iris H-Y Chiu* 
Abstract: The regulation of corporate behavior has persisted in spite of peaks of 
neo-liberalism in many developed jurisdictions of the world, including the U.K. 
This paradox is described as “regulatory capitalism” by a number of scholars. 
Of particular note is the proliferation of corporate regulation to govern 
“socially responsible” behavior in recent legislative reforms in the EU and 
U.K. In seeking to answer the broader question of whether corporate regulation 
indeed effectively governs and moderates corporate behavior, this paper focuses 
on the nature of corporate regulation. Although different pieces of corporate 
regulation purport to achieve different objectives and impose different types of 
obligations, this paper offers an institutional account of corporate regulation, 
specifically in relation to the U.K.’s regulatory capitalism, as the U.K. is 
typically held up as having a liberal market economy (which is broadly similar 
to the U.S.). In this article, I argue that the nature and effectiveness of corporate 
regulation crucially depends on the nature of regulatory capitalism in the type 
of economic order under discussion. Hence the study of the U.K.’s economic 
order and its efforts in introducing corporate regulation to change corporate 
behavior holds lessons more generally for corporate regulation in economies 
that share similar features. The examination in this article provides an 
overarching framework for distilling the achievements and limitations of 
corporate regulation in such economic contexts. 
First, the paper clarifies that regulatory capitalism in the U.K. is characterized 
by three key tenets that reflect the spirit of the liberal market economy embraced 
here. Over time, gaps have been revealed in the achievements of these tenets of 
regulatory capitalism, particularly in relation to social expectations of the 
regulation of corporate behavior. These gaps have become the subject of 
debates in the realm of “corporate social responsibility” (CSR), where 
business, civil society, and the state frame the expectations of corporate 
behavior in contested ways: in relation to the scope of responsibility, the 
motivations for corporate behavior, the theoretical premises, and business 
practices. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2007-2009, we 
observe increasing legalization in the EU and U.K. of CSR issues, framed in 
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“new governance” regulatory techniques. They hold promise for change in 
corporate conduct through deeper forms of corporate engagement and 
accountability, but they appear at the same time relatively undemanding and 
susceptible to cosmetic compliance. By discussing key examples in new 
corporate regulation reforms in the EU and U.K., we seek to understand why 
recent corporate regulation reforms seem to offer mixed and, in some cases, 
relatively limited achievements in governing corporate behavior. We argue that 
the institutional account of corporate regulation continues to be able to explain 
regulatory weaknesses and limited achievements, in spite of the deployment of 
“new governance” regulatory techniques. This is because new governance 
regulatory techniques are implemented within the ethos of regulatory capitalism 
which limits their potential to introduce paradigm shifts. However, the 
limitations of these regulatory reforms highlight more sharply the institutional 
shifts that are needed in order to connect the efficacy of corporate regulation 
with meeting social expectations. 
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The inquiry in this paper is what corporate regulation has achieved 
over recent decades and contributes to the discourse on “regulatory 
effectiveness.” One could turn to empirical research, and indeed a recent 
paper finds that in post-1970 common law countries, corporate regulation is 
reactive in nature, and has little role to play in moderating future corporate 
behavior.1 Despite the overall pessimistic finding, we observe the 
indefatigable advancement of corporate regulation, from product liability2 
and environmental degradation, 3 to the recent surge in corporate regulation 
that deals with social responsibility such as human rights, corruption, and 
stakeholders.4 Can regulatory effectiveness really be dismissed? We 
recognize that regulation can be introduced by policy-makers for a variety 
of reasons including protectionist purposes,5 but we focus here on the 
objective of moderating corporate excesses or changing corporate 
behavior.6 Even if we think of regulation as susceptible to bureaucratic 
agendas,7 or as being reactive or weak, many commentators8 continue to 
affirm its importance in meeting public interest objectives, supplying public 
and collective goods, meeting distributive and welfare objectives, and 
responding to the needs of society. 
The precise weighting of regulatory effectiveness is not what this 
paper sets out to do; rather, we argue that an institutional account of 
corporate regulation is necessary to illuminate the issue of regulatory 
effectiveness in changing corporate behavior.9 As Section I will explain, we 
seek to give an account of how corporate regulation works as an institution 
                                                          
 1 Luzi Hail et al., Corporate Scandals and Regulation 1-39 (ECGI Working Paper, 
2017), http://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/hail-tahoun-wangun
pixelated_0.pdf. 
 2 Strict liability introduced in product liability regulation has advanced consumer 
protection to a degree beyond private law rights. See John TD Wood, Consumer Protection: 
A Case of Successful Regulation, in REGULATORY THEORY 633-51 (Peter Drahos ed., 2017) 
(citations omitted). 
 3 See overviews in JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION 475-531 (2000); in relation to the U.K., see TONY PROSSER, THE REGULATORY 
ENTERPRISE 223-35 (2010). 
 4 See Section III. 
 5 Examples include the Bubble Act in the 18th century, which had the effect of 
entrenching the power and monopolies of chartered corporations in the U.K. 
 6 See Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Introduction, in EXPLAINING 
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 1-34 (Christine Parker & Vibeke 
Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011). 
 7 See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3-21 (1971); but see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the 
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1-168, (1998). 
 8 See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 
(2014); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM 1-31 (2008). 
 9 Which informs analysis of regulatory effectiveness at more granular levels in relation 
to distinct pieces of corporate regulation. 
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of our capitalist tradition, in order to appraise its achievements and 
limitations. Our institutional account of corporate regulation is able to shed 
light on a number of more specific and topical issues, particularly the likely 
“effectiveness” of a new trend in corporate regulation targeted at the social 
responsibility aspects of corporate behavior,10 and the achievements and 
limitations of new regulatory techniques such as new governance 11 that 
support such regulation. We seek to understand why regulatory innovations 
such as new governance techniques, which have been developed with much 
promise in respect of governing corporate behavior, have only been 
supported by mixed results. 
This article defines the scope of “corporate regulation” as law that 
addresses corporate behavior, not limited to the corporate form or 
governance. Aguilera et al12 provide a comprehensive mapping of the 
drivers for corporate behavioral change at the levels of the individual, the 
firm or organization, the national or institutional, and the supranational.13 
The range of behavioral drivers include individual ethics, organizational 
pressures and culture, bottom-up third party pressures and initiatives, 
incentives and pressures entailing from institutions such as law and 
regulation, and supranational developments such as international codes and 
soft law. Hence, corporate regulation is one but an important driver for 
change in corporate conduct and behavior.14 Regulation can, through a 
variety of techniques,15 incentivize or force changes to corporate conduct 
                                                          
 10 Discussed in Sections B and C. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836-863 
(2007). 
 13 Id. at 837. 
 14 For an exploration as to why public policy interfaces with corporate social 
responsibility issues, see Jette Knudsen & Dana Brown, Why Governments Intervene: 
Exploring Mixed Motives for Public Policies on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 PUB. 
POL’Y & ADMIN. 51-70 (2015); see also Reinhard Steurer, The Role of Governments in 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Characterising Public Policies on CSR in Europe, 43 
POL’Y SCI. 49-72 (2010). On regulation as a tool of choice for public policy, see Michael 
Moran, The Rise of the Regulatory State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND 
GOVERNMENT 383 (David Coen et al. eds., 2010); see also Barak Orbach, What is 
Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1-10 (2012). For an economic explanation for why 
regulation is a tool of choice for implementing policy, see David P. Baron, Regulation and 
Legislative Choice, 19 RAND J. ECON. 467-477 (1988). However, regulation is not the only 
means in navigating the business-government relationship, as business influences 
government too in terms of policy, even as governments make choices to govern businesses 
through various means including hybrid means and tools involving public and private sites 
of power and capacity. See Gregory Schaffer, Law and Business, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, supra, at 63. 
 15 This could be in relation to business activities, objectives, conduct, standards or 
processes. On the different modes of public policy “partnering” with corporate or other 
voluntary initiatives in shaping corporate conduct, see overview in Neil Gunningham, 
Regulation: From Traditional to Cooperative, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WHITE 
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and behavior.16 The regulatory context is also important for developing 
“soft law”17 and initiatives that complement or co-shape one another for the 
purpose of influencing change in corporate behavior.18 Indeed the existence 
                                                                                                                                      
COLLAR CRIME 503 (Shanna Van Slyke et al. eds., 2016); Laura Albareda et al., Public 
Policies on Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Governments in Europe, 74 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 391-407 (2007). 
 16 The importance of regulation as effecting public policy is discussed generally in Neil 
Gunningham & Robert A. Kagan, Regulation and Business Behavior, 27 L. & POL’Y 213-
217 (2005); Jenny Fairbrass & Anna Zueva-Owens, Conceptualising Corporate Social 
Responsibility: ‘Relational Governance’ Assessed, Augmented, and Adapted, 105 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 321-335 (2012). The effectiveness of regulation as articulating norms reflecting 
social acceptability, and clarifying corporations’ “social license to operate” is discussed in 
Karin Buhmann, Public Regulators and CSR: The ‘Social Licence to Operate’ in Recent 
United Nations Instruments on Business and Human Rights and the Juridification of CSR, 
136 J. BUS. ETHICS 699-714 (2016); Onyeka Osuji, Fluidity of Regulation-CSR Nexus: The 
Multinational Corporate Corruption Example, 103 J. BUS. ETHICS 31-57 (2011); the power 
of state enforcement that regulation entails is often a powerful incentive for behavioral 
change, see Céline Gainet, Exploring the Impact of Legal Systems and Financial Structure 
on Corporate Responsibility, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS 195-222 (2010). Regulation is often a 
necessary institutional context for more powerful stakeholder monitoring and civil society 
engagement with companies, see Min Dong Paul Lee, Configuration of External Influences: 
The Combined Effects of Institutions and Stakeholders on Corporate Social Responsibility 
Strategies, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 281-296 (2011); Jan Lepoutre et al., Dealing with 
Uncertainties When Governing CSR Policies, 73 J. BUS. ETHICS 391-408 (2007). Although 
regulation is state-centered, McInerney argues that it remains salient and potent in a 
globalized world, see Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: 
Towards Binding Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171-200 
(2007); commentators also call for more internationally binding laws to curb regulatory 
arbitrage, see Ulrich Mueckenberger & Sarah Jastram, Transnational Norm-Building 
Networks and the Legitimacy of Corporate Social Responsibility Standards, 97 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 223-239 (2010)). See also EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO 
REGULATION, supra note 6, at 1-34 (discussions generally on rationales for regulation, modes 
of securing compliance, and limitations). For specific examples of regulatory success, see 
DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND JUSTICE ON 
THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 65-103 (2012); Caryl Pfeiffer, How the Clean Air Interstate Rule 
Will Affect Investment and Management Decisions in the US Electricity Sector, in 
STRATEGIES, MARKETS AND GOVERNANCE: EXPLORING COMMERCIAL AND REGULATORY 
AGENDAS 151–65 (Ralf Boscheck ed., 2008); Ralf Boscheck, Strategy, Markets and 
Governance, in STRATEGIES, MARKETS AND GOVERNANCE: EXPLORING COMMERCIAL AND 
REGULATORY AGENDAS, supra, at 3-32 (discusses the legalization of the Kimberley process 
for certifying that diamonds sourced by MNCs are free from being tainted with exploitation 
of civil conflict); Ralf Boscheck, On Governing Natural Resources, in STRATEGIES, 
MARKETS AND GOVERNANCE: EXPLORING COMMERCIAL AND REGULATORY AGENDAS, supra, 
at 208–24. 
 17 Soft law usually refers to instruments that fall short of the qualities of hard law, this 
definition will be clarified in the discussion of the relationship between regulation and soft 
law later in the article. 
 18 The complexity of the matrix of various governance initiatives is discussed in Bryan 
Horrigan, 21st Century Corporate Social Responsibility Trends – An Emerging Comparative 
Body of Law and Regulation on Corporate Responsibility, Governance, and Sustainability, 4 
MCQUARIE J. BUS. L. 85-122 (2007); Reinhard Steurer, Disentangling Governance: A 
Synoptic View of Regulation by Government, Business, and Civil Society, 46 POL. SCI. 387-
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of regulation is often crucial to the success or otherwise of voluntary, third-
party or civil society-led initiatives that seek to influence changes in 
corporate conduct.19 Hence, by focusing on giving an institutional account 
of corporate regulation, this article does not marginalize the importance of 
other types of initiatives. Quite the contrary, it argues that a clear and rich 
understanding of the institution of corporate regulation is essential to the 
larger picture of developing and evaluating endeavors by governments, civil 
society, and business to change corporate behavior.20 
Section I first explores the development of corporate regulation in the 
U.K. as an institution of regulatory capitalism. Corporate regulation 
supports and is integral to the ethos of the capitalist tradition embraced in 
many jurisdictions in the world.21 We discuss the key tenets and 
achievements of regulatory capitalism but also highlight its limitations as 
crucially defined by our capitalist economic model. 
Section II discusses how regulatory limitations have been increasingly 
exposed and challenged in the social sphere. Socially-organized calls for 
CSR have become clearer and louder, entailing developments in the 
voluntary and largely transnational space, in the form of new governance 
and “soft law.” The global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 brought about 
a culmination in ideological crises of faith in modern capitalism. We 
observe in its wake the surfacing of social discontent amidst disruptions to 
political power. In response, policy-makers globally have introduced an 
unprecedented surge in the legalization of CSR. Section III analyses this 
phenomenon and the package of regulatory reforms introduced in the U.K. 
and EU to shed light on whether such legalization, which incorporates new 
governance regulatory techniques, indicates paradigm shifts in corporate 
regulation. We find mixed results and conclude that there is no crucial 
paradigm shift. However, we explain our findings in Section IV and argue 
that the mixed achievements in recent corporate regulation reforms are 
                                                                                                                                      
410 (2013). 
 19 Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely 
Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361-397 (2010); 
for how the legal environment supports non-state actors in governance, see John L. 
Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially Responsible Ways? An Institutional 
Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 946-967 (2007); Ronald 
Jeurissen, Institutional Conditions of Corporate Citizenship, 53 J. BUS. ETHICS 87-96 (2004); 
and for a specific study of the “responsible care” program’s effectiveness against the 
regulatory context, see Stephen Finger & Shanti Gamper-Rabindran, Does Industry Self-
Regulation Reduce Accidents? Responsible Care in the Chemical Sector, 43 J. REG. ECON. 1-
30 (2013) (argues for the necessity of the regulatory context for the success of voluntary 
compliance programs). 
 20 See also Jodi Short, Self-Regulation in the Regulatory Void: “Blue Moon” or “Bad 
Moon”?, 649 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL’Y & SOC. SCI. 22-34 (2013) (argues that the lack of 
corporate regulation is often a regulatory void and is not substituted by effective means of 
soft law or self-regulation). 
 21 David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL’Y & SOC. SCI. 12-32 (2005). 
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affected by old patterns of regulatory weaknesses. These are inherent in the 
institutional account of corporate regulation. Nevertheless, this institutional 
account pinpoints the precise limitations of recent corporate regulation 
reforms and the path to institutional change. 
I. CORPORATE REGULATION IN THE U.K. AS A PHENOMENON OF 
REGULATORY CAPITALISM 
A. The Capitalist Order of the Liberal Market Economy and the Nature of 
Regulatory Capitalism 
The capitalist economic model in the U.K. is described as an “Anglo-
liberal” economy22 or as termed by the varieties of capitalism literature, a 
“liberal market economy.”23 The U.S. also subscribes to a “liberal market 
economic order.”24 Fundamentally, a capitalist economic order upholds the 
freedom of exchange expressed in market relations, seen as the essential 
counterpart to political freedom in democratic states.25 Markets are 
regarded as places where individuals seeking to maximize their welfare can 
make efficient choices based on their individualistic perceptions of 
opportunity cost.26 The promotion of free markets can be seen as 
establishing the necessary conditions for realizing economic freedoms and 
individual success.27 The hallmark of the British model is the acceptance of 
the supremacy of the market in coordinating economic relations whether 
they are investment, production, distribution or consumption — a 
phenomenon some call “market fundamentalism.” 28 Such market 
                                                          
 22 COLIN HAY & ANTHONY PAYNE, CIVIC CAPITALISM AT 4 (2015). 
 23 Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
1-70 (Peter A Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). Although this characterization is derived 
from the perspective of how firms structure their relationships in order to organize economic 
activity from production to distribution to consumption, and the institutions that support and 
advance such structuring, the ramifications of the British capitalist order for the nature of 
corporations and corporate regulation (including corporate law and governance) are 
especially on point for this article. 
 24 Id. at 1-34 
 25 Martin Wolf, The Morality of the Market, 138 FOREIGN POL’Y 46-50 (2003). 
 26 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICS 3-24 (19th ed. 
2009) (discussing the basic economic concept of opportunity cost that underlies “micro-
economic” behavior, and frames a choice in relation to what else is traded off or foregone, 
i.e., that a choice is made because it is preferred to alternatives). For the basic economic 
concept of opportunity cost that underlies “micro-economic” behavior, see SAMUELSON & 
NORDHAUS, supra, at 3-17. 
 27 One can reconcile Hayek’s libertarian support of the free market with Amartya Sen’s 
argument that political and economic liberties are key institutions, though not exclusively, 
for the development of real economic well-being for every individual; see FRIEDRICH 
HAYEK, ROAD TO SERFDOM 63-90 (1944); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 13-85 
(1999). 
 28 This similar model is also a hallmark of the US economy; see JOSEPH STIGLITZ, 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 39:85 (2019) 
92 
fundamentalism rose to its political peak in the 1980s under the Thatcher 
governments in the U.K. and the Reagan administration in the U.S.29 
Although markets are not regarded as perfect and the development of law 
and regulation has played a part in addressing market distortions and 
failures,30 the Anglo-American model of capitalism today has continued to 
reflect many features of market fundamentalism.31 
The importance of marketization of economic relations has profoundly 
affected the organization of economic activity in corporations. The 
corporate sector in Britain was dominated by monopolies established under 
Royal Charter until the 19th century,32 and family-owned and closely knit 
companies until the end of the First World War.33 The organization of 
economic activity within a corporate structure was not only an economic 
phenomenon34 but had social and political implications.35 The corporation 
ushered in an economic society in terms of structuring economic relations36 
and bringing about social changes such as social mobility.37 From the end 
of the Second World War, the marketization of the corporation developed 
incrementally with the rise in the market for corporate control and 
                                                                                                                                      
FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 1-57 
(2010); see also LEE BOLDEMAN, THE CULT OF THE MARKET: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS 1-34 (2007) (discussing how this similar model is also a hallmark of 
the U.S. economy). 
 29 See SALLY WHEELER, CORPORATIONS AND THE THIRD WAY 14, 44 (2002) (describing 
the “New Right”). 
 30 See JOHN MCDERMOTT, CORPORATE SOCIETY 1-2 (1991) (indicating that even where 
free markets find political support, markets areas where law and regulation are absent does 
not reflect reality). 
 31 See HAY & PAYNE, supra note 22; see also ADAIR TURNER, JUST CAPITAL: THE 
LIBERAL ECONOMY 364-79 (2001). Although Sally Wheeler argues that the election of the 
New Labour government in 1997 marked a turning point for Britain’s economic model 
towards centrist politics and a middle way, termed “The Third Way” in conceiving of a more 
stakeholder-conscious and ethical economic model, hence shaping the social position of the 
corporation, such change has arguably not taken place under the stewardship of the Labour 
government 1997-2010 which has since given way to a predominantly Conservative 
government that supports the liberal market economic model; see WHEELER, supra note 29, 
at 29-33 
 32 The East India and South Sea Companies were protected by the Bubble Act, which 
prevented similar enterprises from being incorporated. Only after the repeal of the Bubble 
Act in 1825 did Britain emerge from its “corporate lag.” See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESSES TRANSFORMED 175-220 (2010). 
 33 Id. at 252-381. 
 34 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386-405 (1937). 
 35 Discussed in relation to how the Cadburys merged economic enterprise with social 
provision for their employees; see WHEELER, supra note 29, at 33. 
 36 The corporation is analyzed as a social institution structuring economic relations; see 
MCDERMOTT, supra note 30, at 1-2. 
 37 See, e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & REINHARD BENDIX, SOCIAL MOBILITY IN 
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 5-27 (1991). 
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ownership of shares.38 The promotion of market fundamentalism peaked 
with the dismantling of Keynesian economic management policies in the 
1980s, as the British state relinquished direct economic agency, privatized 
nationalized industries,39 and pursued a policy of enhancing corporate 
competitiveness. This era marked a decisive shift in the characterization of 
British corporations as market-based actors, and has had a lasting effect 
upon corporate behavior. Corporations as market-based actors pursue 
individualistic and “rational” micro-economic behavior, profoundly 
changing the way economic relationships are structured within and beyond 
the corporation,40 as well as how they perceive their roles in society.41 
Public policy promoted the structuring of economic relations through the 
market, and market supremacy crucially trumped organized relations 
between firms and labor, marking the start of the decline of the institution 
of collective bargaining.42 Under the economic policies introduced by the 
Thatcher government in the U.K., government involvement in economic 
                                                          
 38 CHEFFINS, supra note 32, at 252-381 (discussing how mergers and acquisitions 
activity rose to disrupt close family ownership of companies, and then the growth of the 
stock market and the willingness on the part of corporations to make public offers, matched 
by the growth in appetite in the investing community, particularly institutions, resulted in 
greater dispersion of ownership in British publicly listed companies). 
 39 Stephen Young, The Nature of Privatisation in Britain, 1979–85, 9 W. EUR. POL. 235-
252 (1986); see Richard Seymour, A Short History of Privatisation in the UK: 1979-2012, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/29/
short-history-of-privatisation. 
 40 As market-based actors, corporations may choose to frame their relationships in 
singularly economic terms. Inherent in attaining efficiency is the freedom to exit a 
transactional relationship, prizing choice and efficiency over social values such as 
commitment. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 1-20 (1970) 
(provides an analytical paradigm for relational ordering). Exit through the market may 
provide individual relief from discontent but contributes nothing to improvement of the 
situation whether in firms, organizations, politics or business. Voice is a more painstaking 
route as effort is made to influence change. Exit, for its short-termist efficiency advantages, 
is questioned as to its effectiveness in contributing to longer-term political, social or 
economic ordering. 
 41 This is marked by the gradual shift away from socially conscious or “values ethics”-
based roles; see WHEELER, supra note 29, at 1-58 (argues for a return to a “third way” in the 
characterization of corporate purpose and governance in between the “New Right” policies 
of the 1980s and 1990s and the discredited socialist policies after the fall of communism in 
the early 1990s. Such a third way was offered at a time coinciding with the election of a 
Labour government in the U.K. in 1997 which represented an era of centrist politics). 
Bratton also argues that corporations moved away from a social welfare role at the same 
time in the U.S., as Reagan’s government ushered in market fundamentalist policies to 
change an economic landscape marked by disenchantment with the centralized hands of state 
economic management and the managerial class in corporations. See William W. Bratton, 
The Separation of Corporate Law from Social Welfare, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767-790 
(2017). 
 42 Richard F. Disney et al., British Unions in Decline: An Examination of the 1980s Fall 
in Trade Union Recognition 403-419 (NBER Working Paper No. w4733, 2000), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=250345. 
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activity declined, and the private sector clearly came to the forefront in 
relation to “rowing” the economy, which refers to the provision of goods 
and services and the carrying out of technological innovation. Although 
commentators doubt that the government ever had a very strong hand in 
economic and industrial policies before,43 as compared to the growth of the 
welfare state during that time,44 the 1980s clearly marked the start of a new 
form of economic capitalism in Britain. 
Paradoxically, it is observed that the state grew concomitantly in terms 
of its regulatory remit and apparatus.45 It is a myth that systemic 
deregulation had taken place. Instead, this is an age of regulatory 
capitalism, a phenomenon observed not only in the U.K. but globally. 46 
Regulatory capitalism may be seen as the balance to market 
fundamentalism. The role of the state in economic policy is clarified as that 
of “steering” while the private sector is responsible for rowing.47 The 
objectives of regulation are to steer away from the problems that unbridled 
markets give rise to, such as market failures48 to provide collective goods.49 
Such moderation nevertheless supports markets so that they can work 
optimally. The nature of regulation has gradually become infused with 
economic analysis and market-based concepts.50 
                                                          
 43 Referring to post-war Britain, see PETER A. HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY 23-
136(1986); R. C. O. Matthews, Why Has Britain Had Full Employment Since the War?, 78 
ECON. J. 555-569 (1968) (arguing that Britain’s fiscal policy did not contribute a significant 
part to post-war full employment and economic boom, as private sector investment was the 
most significant factor). This was also not due to particularly robust industrial policy 
adopted by Britain, as such weaknesses were later discussed in S. N. Broadberry & N. F. R. 
Crafts, British Economic Policy and Industrial Performance in the Early Post-War Period, 
38 HIST. BUS. 65, 65 (1996) (argues that post-war economic boom was also not due to 
particularly robust industrial policy adopted by Britain. 
 44 MICHAEL HILL, THE WELFARE STATE IN BRITAIN: A POLITICAL HISTORY SINCE 1945, 
chapters 2 and 3 (1993). 
 45 Michael Moran, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Britain, 54 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 
19-34 (2001). 
 46 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 8, at 1-31 (2008). 
 47 “Rowing” depicts the work of actual service provision and technological innovation 
that is carried out by the private sector as commercial and business activity, while “steering” 
refers to setting policy in order to influence, govern, or incentivize behavior or output in 
relation to rowing. See Levi-Faur, supra note 21, at 15; BRAITHWAITE, supra note 46. 
 48 I.e., where markets do not produce optimal outcomes due to structural problems such 
as information asymmetry, oligopolistic structures, etc.; MARTIN CAVE & ROBERT BALDWIN, 
UNDERSTANDING REGULATION 9-17 (1999); BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND REGULATION 18-25, 47-53 (2007). 
 49 Also includes prevention of social harm, where such prevention is more efficient than 
ex post litigation, see Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Schleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory 
State, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 401-425 (2003); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus 
Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357-397 (1983). 
 50 The “Law and Economics” school of thought has American origins. See Robert van 
Horn & Philip Mirowski, The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth of 
Neoliberalism, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PÉLERIN 139-78 (2015). A key British commentator 
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The economically-driven model of regulation can be seen, for 
example, in the regulation of utilities51 which focuses on anti-competitive 
behavior, and in financial regulation which imposes mandatory disclosure52 
to overcome information asymmetries in the markets for securities and 
financial products.53 The growth of many regulatory agencies54 is premised 
upon the need to correct failures in markets to support optimal market 
outcomes. Indeed, in 2004, the U.K. government accepted a set of 
principles recommended in the Hampton Report,55 including refraining 
from regulatory intervention in favor of “economic progress” unless 
necessary and ensuring the efficiency of regulatory administration and 
action. This has given rise to governmental commitment to “better” and 
more efficient evaluation of regulatory policy and design as a whole,56 
                                                                                                                                      
elucidates how economic analysis and market-based concepts have become integral to 
regulatory thinking. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT 1-25 (2004) 
(elucidates how market concepts feature in legal reasoning in the U.K. context). However, 
the U.K. and EU employ economic concepts to legal and regulatory policy but are often 
cognizant too of the limitations of these concepts. See ARISTIDES N. HATZIS & NICHOLAS 
MERCURO, LAW AND ECONOMICS 1-31, 89-120, 203-44 (2015); KATJA LAGENBUCHER, 
ECONOMIC TRANSPLANTS: ON LAWMAKING FOR CORPORATIONS AND CAPITAL MARKETS 11-
40; 64-70 (2017) (an analysis is made of regulatory problems framed in economic terms, 
solutions sourced in economic models and the imperfections these entail for regulation and 
judicial decision-making). 
 51 John Vickers & George Yarrow, Regulation of Privatised Firms in Britain, 32 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 465 (1988); PROSSER, supra note 3, at 176-200; Mark Thatcher, Institutions, 
Regulation, and Change: New Regulatory Agencies in the British Privatised Utilities, 21 W. 
EUR. POL. 120 (1998). 
 52 More to be discussed in relation to securities regulation shortly. 
 53 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., ECONOMICS FOR EFFECTIVE REGULATION: OCCASIONAL PAPER 
13, 3-41 (2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/occassional-paper-
13.pdf (the most recent affirmation of an economically-driven approach to financial 
regulation). See also earlier pronouncements on an economically-driven, risk-based 
approach when the regulator’s predecessor, the Financial Services Authority, was 
established. JULIA BLACK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF RISK-BASED REGULATION IN FINANCIAL 
SERVICES: CANADA, THE UK AND AUSTRALIA: A RESEARCH REPORT 1-54 (2004), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/law/people/academic-staff/julia-black/Documents/black19.pdf; JOHN 
ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 3-21 (2016). 
 54 The growth of regulatory agencies has come to be a key observation at a global level 
for many jurisdictions in the age of regulatory capitalism. See, Levi-Faur, supra note 21, at 
16-19. Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17 W. EUR. POL. 
77-101 (1994) (discussing a similar underpinning for European agencies). 
 55 PHILIP HAMPTON, HM TREASURY, REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS: EFFECTIVE 
INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT: THE HAMPTON REVIEW – FINAL REPORT 7-8 (2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/bud05hampton_150305_640.pdf. 
 56 The Better Regulation Task Force was introduced in 2006, then re-styled as the Better 
Regulation Commission in 2008-2009 as an independent advisory body to the government 
promoting rational and efficient design in regulation]. The work of the Better Regulation 
Commission continues in the Regulatory Policy Committee, which is an advisory and non-
departmental government body sponsored by the Department of Business, Industrial 
Strategy, and Energy. The Committee continues to support the government in cost-benefit 
analysis and rationalizing regulatory policy and design today. See The Better Regulation 
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which has continued through changes in government. 
Although the purposes of regulation are varied, regulatory thinking has 
predominantly been shaped by economic notions.57 Policy-making and 
regulatory technique are infused with “market-based” wisdom, as regulators 
consider the balance of risk and harm to determine the extent of 
intervention,58 the need for regulatory resources to be allocated according to 
risk-based regulation,59 and the use of cost-benefit analyses60 (however 
imperfectly)61 to account for regulatory initiatives. 
Regulation has also been introduced to govern industries where 
business activity has resulted in social harms and scandals,62 producing 
regulatory regimes that target a mixture of economic and social demands.63 
In sum, regulatory capitalism is heavily infused with the economic 
intellectual tradition, as economic behavior and its control become 
                                                                                                                                      
Commission, Dep’t for Bus. Innovation & Skills (archived Mar. 4, 2010), https://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/reviewing-regulation/
commission/page44086.html. 
 57 See, e.g., FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 53, at 3-41; see also LAGENBUCHER, supra 
note 50, 11-40, 64-70. 
 58 Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and 
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 207-262 (2003); 
CHRISTOPHER HOOD ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK: UNDERSTANDING RISK REGULATION 
REGIMES , chapters 1 and 2 (2004); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK 
REGULATION AT RISK 1-30 (2003) (provides a critical approach to the “economic” thinking 
behind regulatory policy). 
 59 BLACK, supra note 53, at 1-54. 
 60 This is a key remit of the Regulatory Policy Committee. See also Julie Froud & 
Anthony Ogus, Rational Social Regulation and Compliance Cost Assessment, 74 PUB. 
ADMIN. 221, 221-37 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State 1-43 (Coase-Sandor 
Institute for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 39, 1996) (American perspective); and 
for improvements to such a methodology in order to embrace more holistic and qualitative 
judgments, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1369-1421 
(2014); Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 323-374 (2001); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Essay: Moral 
Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 103 VA. L. REV. 1809-1860 (2017) (supports the 
underlying rationality in cost-benefit analyses but not a narrow and metricized approach). 
 61 Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of 
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L.R. 87-137 (2016). 
 62 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 8, at 32-63. Scandals may involve social harms such as 
BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or otherwise known as ‘mad cow’s disease) which 
culminated in greater food regulation in the U.K., or financial crises, such as those of in the 
1970s, that led to the introduction of bank capital adequacy standards which cascaded from 
the international (Basel Committee of Banking Supervision) to the national. The drivers of 
regulatory capitalism will be in greater detail discussed shortly in greater detail. 
 63 This has been observed by Prosser in relation to the U.K., as well as Braithwaite and 
Drahos in relation to global business regulation, as both books observe substantial 
developments in social policy such as in relation to public and employment health and 
safety, product, and food and drug regulation, as well as environmental regulation in relation 
to anti-pollution of air and water. See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 223; BRAITHWAITE & 
DRAHOS, supra note 3, at 475. 
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increasingly framed as incentive-based. 
Although this is not the only paradigm in which regulation is designed 
and implemented, regulatory capitalism in the U.K. can, on the whole, be 
regarded as neo-liberal in nature, 64 expressed through policy-making and 
regulatory initiatives that largely go towards making the marketized 
economic order work better. Regulatory capitalism calibrates state-business 
relationships in such a way as to move away from simplistic notions of 
antagonism or paternalistic oversight, but as a necessary market 
companion,65 promoting the fulfilment of economic rowing by business. 
This position has persisted in the U.K. since the 1980s.66 
B. The Three Tenets of Corporate Regulation 
We argue that corporate regulation in the U.K.’s liberal market 
economy is underpinned by the ethos in regulatory capitalism, giving rise to 
three regulatory tenets that reflect this ethos. First, the law for the 
organization and structuring in corporations, i.e. company law, respects 
corporations as private economic organizations free to determine their own 
purposes, and does not intervene into their objectives. 67 Company law 
preserves or facilitates the economic freedoms of freely associating agents 
in the model of a corporation as a “contractarian organization” which 
manages its internal efficiencies and is private in nature.68 The role of 
                                                          
 64 See Peter Drahos, Regulatory Capitalism, Globalization and the End of History, 1 
INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 1-23 (2014) (a characterization that several 
commentators agree with). 
 65 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 8, at 197. 
 66 The New Labour government continued to support “better regulation” so that 
regulation is effective but also proportionate, cognizant of business criticisms of costly 
burdens and red tape; see PROSSER, supra note 3, at 201. 
 67 For example, corporate purpose is up to the management and shareholders to decide; 
the doctrine of ultra vires in company law was decisively abandoned in the reforms made to 
the Companies Act 2006. This doctrine used to uphold the existence of objects clauses in 
company constitutions that limited the sphere of corporate activity and could render void 
third-party contracts entered into pursuant to purposes outside of the objects clauses; see 
Ashbury Ry Carriage and Iron Co v. Riche [1879] LR 7 (HL) 653 (U.K.). The doctrine may 
be viewed as an obsolete aspect of the “social contract” companies have with society in 
return for the privilege of incorporation (as a state-granted “franchise” or “concession”). 
Companies now have unlimited objects by default, (see section 21, UK Companies Act 
2006), and are thus free to pursue their private economic freedoms, while being accountable 
primarily to shareholders as to the results of those economic pursuits. Also, much of 
company law, in terms of internal governance, is enabling in nature, such as the possibility 
of opting out of the enabling default “constitution” set out in the Model Articles Regulations, 
and the Foss v Harbottle doctrine that looks to shareholders to ratify internal breaches or 
errors before resorting to derivative actions, now (see s239, UK Companies Act 2006). 
 68 Boiling down to a “nexus of contracts” organized within the internal marketized 
model of the firm. See Coase, supra note 34, at 386–405; the theory establishes the 
“quintessentially private and self-ordered nature of a company’s management affairs,” which 
should be mainly free from state intervention. See, Marc Moore, Private Ordering and 
Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Contractarianism, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
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mandatory law is to provide an efficient framework to meet the needs of 
order, balance, and accountability in the private “administrative” franchise 
that is the company.69 Company law70 essentially constitutes a private 
framework of governance centered upon management control71 subject to 
shareholder primacy.72 This is consonant with the notions of theoretical 
efficiency supported by commentators73 in the economics of organization. 
The legal preference for shareholder centricity is also a legacy issue in the 
U.K., as businesses transformed into corporations from the late 19th century, 
bringing partnership concepts into company law.74 Company law has been 
shaped largely by internal efficiency and governance needs,75 bearing little 
                                                                                                                                      
STUD. 693, 697 (2014). This concept means that company law reflects parties’ default 
hypothetical bargains. See, William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: 
Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521-1564 (1982); Manuel A. Utset, Towards 
a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540-611 (1995); FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1 
(1991). 
 69 See MARC MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE at chapter 
2 (2013) (discusses the theoretical lens of institutional analysis in relation to private 
“administrative” power). 
 70 Such as minority shareholder protection in recourse to the derivative claim (s260-263, 
UK Companies Act 2006); or unfair prejudice petition (s994-996, UK Companies Act 2006), 
and the codified directors’ duties, (s170-177, UK Companies Act 2006). 
 71 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/3229, Schedule 3. 
 72 ANDREW KEAY, SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY IN CORPORATE LAW: CAN IT SURVIVE? 
SHOULD IT SURVIVE? 1-51 (2009). At the global level, shareholder primacy is argued to be a 
model of the corporate economy that has brought about the end of history as being an 
ideological and practical winner; see Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of 
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439-468 (2000); see also Leo Strine Jr., Our 
Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 135-172 (2012). 
 73 Investors are characterized as supplying capital in an incomplete contract, not 
knowing how the corporation would fare, hence they are regarded as “residual claimants” to 
corporate property if the company indeed goes insolvent, and can then exercise rights of 
quasi-property, attached to their shares, in the company. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold 
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 
777-795 (1972). See also Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197-
1230 (1984). Agency economists also see shareholder primacy as the cure to the agency 
problem of separation of ownership from control. See, EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 
68, at 1-3 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305-360 (1976). 
 74 Paddy Ireland, Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of Corporate 
Irresponsibility, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 837-856 (2010). In fact, dispersed ownership only 
started taking off from the post-War period, hence company law served the needs of closely-
held companies where managers were often also shareholders or closely related to other 
shareholders; CHEFFINS, supra note 32, at 221-251 
 75 A model argued to be globally superior. See, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 72, 
at 439 (argues that the shareholder-centric model of corporate governance is regarded as the 
“end of history for corporate law” as such a model, focused singularly on private 
economically-driven interests, seemed best-placed to drive economic purpose, productivity, 
and organization in companies). The private law notions of property and contract underlie 
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relation to social policy.76 As the New Labour government put it in relation 
to reforming company law after it came into power, company law reforms 
carried out in 2006 were about modernizing the company as a business 
vehicle that promotes enterprise and the right conditions for investment and 
employment.77 Company law supports private organizations and economic 
endeavors in order to play its part in growing the economy because the 
company, in the U.K.’s liberal market economy model, is a free agent in the 
market and not a socially-coordinated instrument or public policy.78 
Second, a major source of corporate regulation is securities regulation 
for publicly listed corporations. Such regulation is focused on corporations’ 
responsibilities to the markets that provide them with capital and facilitates 
market-based discipline carried out by investors. Securities regulation was 
pioneered in the U.S. as a socio-economic reform,79 but has since become 
                                                                                                                                      
many of the rights and obligations among constituents in company law. See, John Armour & 
Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 429-465 (2007). 
 76 See Benedict Sheehy, Private and Public Corporate Regulatory Systems: Does CSR 
Provide a Systemic Alternative to Public Law?, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1-54 (2016) (a 
critical account of the dis-embedded corporation). See also Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law 
and the History of Corporate Social Responsibility, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
HISTORY OF COMPANY AND CORPORATE LAW 570 (Harwell Wells ed., 2017). For an analysis 
of the general lack of a wider socially-facing dimension in corporate law, see Jingchen Zhao, 
Promoting More Socially Responsible Corporations Through a Corporate Law Regulatory 
Framework, 37 LEGAL STUD. 103-136 (2017). For an examination of the peripheral nature of 
company law in relation to social policy issues such as climate change in a special volume of 
the International Comparative Corporate Law Journal, see Celia R. Taylor, United States 
Company Law as It Impacts Corporate Environmental Behavior, with Emphasis on Climate 
Change, 11 INT’L. & COMP. CORP. L.J. 7-10 (2015) (U.S. position); Surya Deva, Sustainable 
Business and Australian Corporate Law: An Exploration, 11 INT’L. & COMP. CORP. L.J. 59-
62 (2015) (Australian position). However, the New Labour government did introduce the 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 and Bribery Act 2010 which delved into internal governance 
and behavior within corporations to address social ills, rare phenomena which indicated the 
early changes to regulatory capitalism, and will be discussed below. 
 77 DEP’T TRADE & INDUS., COMPANY LAW REFORM 8–15 (2005), http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060214052726/http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/WhitePaper.htm. 
 78 Such as in the coordinated market economy which is represented by the German 
model, a highlight of such model being the adoption of co-determination into corporate 
governance. See Sigurt Vitols, Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany 
and the UK, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 23, at 337-60. 
 79 Securities regulation was introduced after the Great Depression and represented part 
of the socio-economic New Deal reforms. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL 
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 73-100 (1st ed. 1982). For a discussion about the distributive tenor of 
the New Deal reforms as a distribution of informational power to the market so that 
informational power is not concentrated in the hands of small coteries of securities brokers, 
see Emilios Avgouleas, Market Accountability and Pre- and Post-Trade Transparency: The 
Case for the Reform of the EU Regulatory Framework: Parts 1 & 2, 19 COMPANY LAW., 
162-170, 202-210 (1998). Securities regulation required mandatory disclosure to be made by 
issuers of corporate securities, so that “truth” in securities can be brought to light in the 
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characterized as chiefly economic in nature since the 1980s, as theoretical 
commentaries on securities regulation revolve around the efficiency of 
securities markets for securing investor protection.80 Regulation is primarily 
framed to support the optimal working of markets and such a basis has also 
driven the development of EU securities regulation,81 culminating in major 
harmonization reforms in the early millennium.82 These have been 
transposed in the U.K. The EU saw legal integration in securities regulation 
as an instrument for capital markets integration,83 a perspective that 
continues today.84 
                                                                                                                                      
market and misspelling can be stamped out. For social policy overtones, see Milton H. 
Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340-1408 (1966). Securities 
regulation is policed and enforced by a new Securities and Exchange Commission, 
representing a new constitutional bargain between state, markets, business and citizenry. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421-510 (1987). 
 80 Referring to information asymmetry between investors and companies issuing 
securities. See John C. Coffee Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717-753 (1984). Efficient prices in securities markets 
(including secondary securities markets) reflect corporate performance so that investors can 
optimally determine the allocation of capital. Hence, it is also necessary to require securities 
issuers to keep feeding secondary markets with information so that issuers’ secondary 
trading prices reflect all information at any given point in time, thereby enabling investors to 
make efficient buy, sell, or hold decisions. This is the efficient capital markets hypothesis 
posited by Eugene Fama, though empirically supported only in its semi-strong form. See 
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383-417 (1970); Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic 
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331-353, 355-386 (2003). On 
theoretical support for the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, see Marcel Kahan, 
Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977-1044 
(1992); Merritt B. Fox, Rethinking Disclosure Liability in the Modern Era, 75 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 903-918 (1997), all of whom support mandatory continuous disclosure as a key to 
maintain stock price accuracy according to the semi-strong form of the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis. 
 81 IRIS H-Y CHIU, REGULATORY CONVERGENCE IN EU SECURITIES REGULATION 1-46 
(2008). 
 82 After the publication of [Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the 
Regulation of European Securities Markets (15 Feb 2001), available at 
http://www.spk.gov.tr/Sayfa/Dosya/114, such as the Directive 2003/71/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when 
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 
2001/34/EC (Prospectus Directive 2003); Directive 2004/109/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonization of transparency 
requirements related to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on 
a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC OJ 2004 L390/38 (Transparency 
Directive 2004). 
 83 Christian Joerges, The Law in the Process of Constitutionalising Europe 3-34 (EUI, 
Working Paper 2002/4, 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=307720; 
EILIS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 8-57 (2004). 
 84 EURO. COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS ACTION PLAN ON BUILDING A CAPITAL MARKETS UNION at 
paragraphs 1-7 (2015), https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/growth-and-
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Securities regulation is purposed towards supporting market-based 
discipline for publicly listed corporations by their investors, an important 
tenet in a well-functioning capital market. Investors could exercise their 
market-based discipline by voting with their feet and supporting a market 
for corporate control, as a means to change corporate management.85 They 
could also choose to be activist and build up stakes in a company in order to 
exercise voice,86 a phenomenon termed as the market for corporate 
influence.87 The marketization of investment relations between the 
company and shareholders has become the chief (and private) means for 
structuring the internal governance relations within the company. Thus, 
when corporate scandals erupted in the early 1990s in relation to internal 
fraud and misrepresentations of financial reporting on securities markets,88 
the key cure for such ills was seen to be investor discipline and scrutiny.89 
The U.K. charted a regime of business-led soft law for the corporate 
governance of listed companies.90 Best practices in corporate governance 
are now enshrined within a code91 that applies on a comply-or-explain basis 
to publicly traded companies.92 The corporate governance of these 
companies is framed as a matter for shareholders to scrutinize and comment 
                                                                                                                                      
investment/capital-markets-union/capital-markets-union-action-plan_en (lays the foundation 
for a number of legislative initiatives, including the Prospectus Regulation 2017). 
 85 James D. Parrino & Robert S. Harris, Takeovers, Management Replacement, and 
Post-Acquisition Operating Performance: Some Evidence from the 1980s, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AT THE CROSSROADS 385 (Donald Chew & Stuart Gillan eds., 2005); Michael 
C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 
11 J. FIN. ECON. 5-50 (1983); Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The 
Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49-68 (1988). Much of the literature dates 
back to the 1980s where takeover activity in the U.S. was roaring. 
 86 See IRIS H-Y. CHIU, THE FOUNDATIONS AND ANATOMY OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM at 
chapters 2-5 (2008) (discusses different types of activism). 
 87 John Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by 
Hedge Funds, 14 J. ALTERNATIVE INV. 17-27 (2012) (on hedge funds in the market for 
corporate influence); see Paul Rose, Shareholder Proposals in the Market for Corporate 
Influence, 66 FLA L. REV. 2179-2228 (2014) (on shareholder proposals generally as 
constituting a market for corporate influence). 
 88 For discussions about the scandal of the fall of the Polly Peck Group and BCCI in the 
early 1990s, see CHIU, supra note 86, at 16-70. 
 89 ADRIAN CADBURY, THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 14-16 
(1992). 
 90 FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 4-15 (2018), 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.pdf. 
 91 Id. at 4-15. 
 92 Alan Dignam, Capturing Corporate Governance: The End of the UK Self-Regulating 
System, 4 INT’L. J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 24-41 (2007). On the efficacy of comply-or-
explain, see Sridhar Arcot et al., Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply or Explain 
Approach Working?, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 193-201 (2010); Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li, 
Comply or Explain: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code, 14 
CORP. GOVERNANCE 486-496 (2006). 
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on,93 neutralizing the social ramifications of the scandals in question. This 
tradition has continued despite the findings of the Myners Report in 2001 
relating to the relative passivity of institutional investors,94 and the findings 
of the Walker Report in 200995 discussing institutional investor apathy in 
relation to the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009. Business and 
markets continue to support shareholder centricity in market discipline,96 a 
position that policy-makers have been willing to endorse.97 Investor 
primacy has brought about a marketized model profoundly shaping the 
objectives98 and the nature of the corporation.99 
Nevertheless, “business regulation” has been developed to affect 
economic and social policy that impacts business or commercial 
activities.100 These are often externally101 addressed to corporations and 
other economic actors but do not intervene in the private spheres of 
corporate objectives or governance. The need for business regulation has 
grown in the era of market fundamentalism. This is because corporations’ 
economic behavior creates externalities, and markets fail to discipline or 
contain such behavior. For example, market failures such as misselling have 
led to a burst in global consumer protection regulation.102 Product safety 
                                                          
 93 See CADBURY, supra note 89, at 48-52(provided the foundation for the first Cadbury 
Code of Corporate Governance). 
 94 PAUL MYNERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UK: A REVIEW at paragraphs 5.24-
5.63 (2001), http://uksif.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MYNERS-P.-2001.-Institutional-
Investment-in-the-United-Kingdom-A-Review.pdf. 
 95 DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER 
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS AT PARAGRAPH 5.10 (2009), 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_
review_261109.pdf. 
 96 Seen in the bottom-up Institutional Shareholders Committee’s first Stewardship 
Principles that evolved to be adopted as the U.K. Stewardship Code by the Financial 
Reporting Council. 
 97 U.K. Stewardship Code sets out optimal principles for shareholder scrutiny and 
engagement with companies, see also Iris H-Y Chiu, Turning Institutional Investors into 
‘Stewards’: Exploring the Meaning and Objectives in ‘Stewardship’, 66 CURRENT LEGAL 
PROBS. 443-481 (2013); Arad Reisberg, The UK Stewardship Code: On the Road to 
Nowhere?, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 217-253 (2015). 
 98 Shareholder primacy model, supra note 75. 
 99 See Karen Ho, Corporate Nostalgia? Managerial Capitalism from a Contemporary 
Perspective, in CORPORATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP 267-88 (Greg Urban ed., 2014) (critical 
account of the company becoming framed chiefly in terms of a tradeable stock with its 
commodity price in an investor’s portfolio). 
 100 Characterized as such in the examination of regulation that has addressed corporate 
and business behavior at a global level, see BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 3, at 88-
471 discussing specific areas of business regulation that are developed outside of corporate 
law. 
 101 Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate 
Governance, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974-990 (2013). 
 102 Wood, supra note 2, at 633-651; Rena Steinzor, The Truth About Regulation in 
America, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 323-346 (2011). 
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has been refined by private law in liability103 as well as by regulatory 
standards and enforcement,104 extending to crucial areas, such as food105 
and drugs,106 especially in the wake of scandals, such as the BSE scandal107 
and the thalidomide scandal.108 Consumer protection reforms have been 
extended to even fundamentalist market including finance.109 Although 
social protection against poor commercial practices underlies these 
regulatory reforms, it is arguable that such business regulation ultimately 
supports market capitalism as consumer confidence is maintained.110 
                                                          
 103 For a discussion on the interface of tort liability and regulation, see Maria Lee, Safety, 
Regulation and Tort: Fault in Context, 74 MOD. L. REV. 555-580 (2011). 
 104 The Consumer Protection Act 1987 provides strict liability for certain unsafe and 
defective products, while the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 regulates misleading 
representations and mis-selling as a result. There remain criticisms of these regimes, but 
advances have been achieved in regulation beyond what private law affords in relation to 
consumer protection. See Wood, supra note 2, at 633-651. Product standards have also been 
subject to international trade-led development (e.g. the CE (Conformité Européene) 
mark in Europe) as well as regulatory prescriptions where relevant; see BRAITHWAITE & 
DRAHOS, supra note 3, at 475-531. 
 105 The Food Standards Agency was established under the Blair government in order to 
address the previous problem of ministerial capture by business. The Food Standards 
Agency has developed a consumer-facing profile, but it is equally oriented towards 
protection as well as promoting consumer choice. It coordinates the implementation of 
standards from the EU Food Agency as well. See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 44-65. For a 
comparison between the American prescriptive regulatory standards in food compared to a 
less robust European approach relying on third-party standards, see Wyn Grant, 
Environmental and Food Safety Policy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 663-83. 
 106 Largely centralized under the European Medicines Agency which vets and approves 
medicines, representing a highly regulated form of product regulation in the interests of 
safety, and a similar approach is taken in the U.S. too; see BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra 
note 3, at 360-396. 
 107 Kamal Ahmed et al., Madness, GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2000), https://www.theguardian.
com/uk/2000/oct/29/bse.focus1. 
 108 Bara Fintel et al., The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and Regulation, 
HELIX (Jul. 28, 2009), https://helix.northwestern.edu/article/thalidomide-tragedy-lessons-
drug-safety-and-regulation. 
 109 The financial market has become a platform for private consumer decisions in 
managing their own financial needs – an age of financialization, according to many. See 
FINANCIALIZATION AT WORK: KEY TESTS AND COMMENTARY at ch13 (Ismail Erturk et al. 
eds., 2008). This market is often criticized due to the inability of consumers to understand 
credence goods and their future performance. See Paul Langley, The Uncertain Subjects of 
Anglo-American Financialization, 65 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 67-91 (2007); Ismail Erturk et al., 
The Democratization of Finance? Promises, Outcomes and Conditions, 14 REV. INT’L POL. 
ECON. 553-575 (2007); Toni Williams, Empowerment of Whom and for What? Financial 
Literacy Education and the New Regulation of Consumer Financial Services, 29 L. & POL’Y 
226-256 (2007). Increasing consumer protection is being seen in financial regulation reforms 
especially after the global financial crisis 2007-2009, which will be discussed below as a key 
driver for regulatory capitalism entering into the cusp of change. See, MADS ANDENAS & IRIS 
H-Y CHIU, THE FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION at chapter 8 (2014). 
 110 Shavell, supra note 49. 
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Further, as the de-socialization of labor-firm relations has taken place 
in the 1980s under the conservative governments,111 regulatory policy has 
become more important in providing the necessary balances to the 
inequalities in employment relationships which are not corrected by labor 
markets. The growth of employee protection legislation in anti-
discrimination rights, health and safety rights, minimum wage rights, and 
other contractual rights112 may to an extent overcome some of the inequality 
of bargaining power between labor and companies, as collective bargaining 
has fallen from vogue.113 
Drahos and Braithwaite114 also observed the rise in environmental 
protection legislation particularly in respect to clean air and water, as 
regulatory capitalism addressed the externalities caused by business 
activity.115 These reforms are arguably a mixture of social and economic 
policy,116 as corporations are forced to prevent, or pay for social cost and 
                                                          
 111 Unlike the co-determination system in Germany which embeds industrial relations 
within the firm, see Stephen C. Smith, On the Economic Rationale for Codetermination 
Law, 16 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 261-281 (1991) There is little socialization of economic 
relations within the British corporate paradigm. In the key labor-firm relationship, a history 
of patchwork regulatory intervention moderated this relationship, albeit while steeped in 
master-servant traditions. See Simon F. Deakin, Legal Origin, Juridical Form and 
Industrialization in Historical Perspective: The Case of the Employment Contract and the 
Joint-Stock Company, 7 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 35-65 (2009). The post-war Labour government 
capitalized on the strength of the state in governing an economy under rebuilding and paved 
the way for institutionalized collective bargaining to take place, via the reformed Trade 
Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1946. The era of the power of the unions possibly came 
closest to socially reframing labor-firm relations, but the achievements of these decades 
were truncated by conservative government policies in the 1980s. The Thatcherite 
perspective was that corporations needed to be saved from being taken hostage by labor 
relations that jeopardized firms’ productivity. The 1980s conservative government policies 
have recalibrated industrial relations since, preserving the marketized model of the 
corporation from further paradigmatic disturbances. 
 112 See, e.g., SIMON FEG ET AL., LABOUR LAW 267-268; 304-414; 601-769; 771-984 (6th 
ed. 2012). 
 113 Disney et al., supra note 42, at 403-419. 
 114 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 3, at 256-295. 
 115 Boscheck, supra note 16, at 151-190; SCHORR, supra note 16, at 65-103. 
 116 The mixed social-economic nature of environmental regulation can be attributed to a 
mixture of public interest and economic efficiency thinking in regulatory ethos and design, 
such as the balance between the precautionary principle and cost-benefit analyses in policy 
generation, the expansive regulatory space for corporations where third party standards, 
audits and civil society activism co-exist with corporate endeavors and regulatory 
enforcement, and innovative regulatory measures. For some examples of discussion, see Neil 
Gunningham, Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures, 21 J. 
ENVTL. L.J. 179-212 (2009); Neil Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental 
Governance: The Localization of Regulation, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 145-166 (2009); Neil 
Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation, in REGULATORY THEORY, supra note 2, 
at 133; ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: 
GREEN CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 81-188 (2006) 
(on how the voluntary adoption of ISO14000 has helped improve environmental 
An Institutional Theory of Corporate Regulation 
39:85 (2019) 
105 
internalize the social price of their activities, such as carrying out risk 
management. The dominance of economic thinking in environmental policy 
can nevertheless be seen in many initiatives, including the carbon emissions 
trading regulation which adopts a marketized approach to regulate 
corporate carbon footprint.117 
Although business regulation intervenes where markets do not work 
optimally, regulatory policy is highly shaped and influenced by business. In 
this political economy, corporations act as businesses, collectively, through 
trade associations118 and international networks,119 generating both 
epistemic authority and lobbying pressure in relation to regulatory policy.120 
Dignam describes corporate law and securities regulation as particularly 
shaped by a “negotiated” regulatory framework between business and 
government.121 The institutional context for corporate regulation is thus 
very much shaped by the peer level,122 power and status123 of business and 
states vis a vis each other. 
The private and shareholder-focused nature of company law, investor-
focused securities regulation, and the expression of much of social policy 
through external regulation have become relatively “stable” tenets of 
corporate regulation. These hallmarks support (a) the neoliberal economic 
agenda, as states and business maintain a companion relationship of 
steering and rowing, and (b) the liberal market economy where economic 
relations are incentive-based and marketized. 
                                                                                                                                      
management in corporates). 
 117 Discussed critically in Sol Piccioto, Paradoxes of Regulating Corporate Capitalism: 
Property Rights and Hyper-Regulation, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 1-15 (2011); see also 
Jonas J. Monast et al., On Morals, Markets, and Climate Change: Exploring Pope Francis’ 
Challenge, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135-162 (2017). 
 118 Sectoral industries organize much lobbying as a form of collective corporate power, 
see discussion in Peter Gourevitch, Politics and Corporate Governance: What Explains 
Policy Outcomes?, in CORPORATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 99, at 183; Gregory 
Shaffer, Law and Business, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, 
supra note 14, at 63; Katherine E. Smith et al., Corporate Coalitions and Policy Making in 
the European Union: How and Why British American Tobacco Promoted ‘‘Better 
Regulation”, 40 J. HEALTH, POL’Y, & L. 325-372 (2015). 
 119 Pamela Camerra-Rowe & Michelle Egan, International Regulators and Network 
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 
404. 
 120 Gourevitch, supra note 118, at 183. 
 121 Dignam, supra note 92, at 24-41. 
 122 CORPORATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 99 (a volume curated to present the vast 
social and political power of corporates derived from their economic power). 
 123 This is the natural trajectory of successful corporations as engines of production and 
wealth creation, as Lazonick critically dismisses economists’ dream of ideal firm sizes as 
small in a world of perfect competition, see William Lazonick, The Corporation in 
Economics, in THE CORPORATION 64 (Grietje Baars & André Spicer eds., 2017). According 
to Lazonick’s argument, it is a positive and not a negative or transitional phenomenon to 
behold the growth of significant corporations in scale and power. 
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C. Deficiencies and Lacunae 
In an economic model of market fundamentalism,124 prices in relevant 
supply and demand side markets drive corporations’ incentive-based 
behavior. Corporations have become insularly focused on profit-
maximization reflected in high securities markets prices, characterized as 
“individualistic” pursuits.125 The incentives for corporate behavior tend to 
cause tensions between the needs of “collective” good or the social 
dimension.126 The tradition of regulatory capitalism has, to an extent, 
addressed corporate conduct that causes direct social harms and market 
failures, but it tends to uphold a broad scope of economic freedom. Hence, 
regulatory capitalism is unlikely to address areas where conflicts arise 
between social expectations and corporations’ economic freedoms. 
Corporations have marginalized the social and ethical dimensions of 
corporate behavior that are not reflected in “market value.” Boldeman 
describes corporate behavior that has become “dehumanizing” and 
“intolerant” of moral or social dimensions.127 Old-fashioned and holistic 
notions such as the moderation of “self-interest” by “moral sentiments” of 
self-restraint,128 or the perspective that a corporation creating economic 
wealth should do so as being entrusted by society129 have become squeezed 
out by market fundamentalism. Corporate exploits could often be at the 
expense of collective good or the social dimension, producing “a-social” 
behavior.130 Further, Hendry gives an account of how market 
fundamentalism has made market values central to business operations, and 
corporations pursuing their business case are merely adhering to the 
morality of self-interest in markets.131 This conception of morality may be 
                                                          
 124 There is an interesting empirical finding of the alignment broadly between national 
culture, such as market fundamentalism, and organizational culture, such as the 
marketization approaches taken in corporations, see GEERT HOFSTEDE ET AL., CULTURES AND 
ORGANISATIONS 320-28 (2010). 
 125 Ho, supra note 99; WHEELER, supra note 29, at chapter 1 (arguing that such 
“individualistic” narrative has dominated corporate behavior in the post-2000s. The book 
critically explores alternative forces to change corporate behavior, such as an awareness of 
‘collective good’, the rise of stakeholder capitalism and ethicality to shape corporate 
objectives and behavior. 
 126 WHEELER, supra note 29, at chapter 1. 
 127 BOLDEMAN, supra note 28, at 280. 
 128 Reconciling Adam Smith’s grand treatises, The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, see SPENCER J. PACK, CAPITALISM AS A MORAL SYSTEM: ADAM SMITH’S 
CRITIQUE OF THE FREE MARKET ECONOMY chapter 1 (2010). 
 129 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 352 (1991). 
 130 Indeed, Bakan’s critical account paints corporate behavior as pathologically 
sociopathic, see JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT 
AND POWER at chapter 3 (2003). 
 131 JOHN HENDRY, BETWEEN ETHICS AND ENTERPRISE: BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT IN A 
BIMORAL SOCIETY chapters 1-2 (2004), and Milton Friedman’s famous pronouncement that 
“the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” is very much reflective of that 
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contested vis-a-vis our human or social conception of morality,132 giving 
rise to a “bimoral” space for negotiation by companies. The bifurcation of 
“business morality” from human or social conceptions,133 or indeed the 
marginalization of the latter134 can serve utilitarian purposes, but create a 
perverse organizational belief system which would be regarded as morally 
dysfunctional.135 
The private nature of corporate objectives is not necessarily 
compatible with ethical or social dimensions. The disengagement of 
corporations from society is criticized by many as, at the very least, the 
privilege of incorporation reflects a certain social contract on the basis of 
state enfranchisement or ‘chartering’ of private activity.136 In the absence of 
regulatory moderation, corporations can adopt a social and bimoral 
behavior where there is a business case. This tendency is further 
exacerbated by global trends. 
The rise in neo-liberalism and globalization has been taken advantage 
of by corporations, bringing profound changes to the economic structures of 
many jurisdictions. International trade and globalization have changed 
corporate configurations and many take advantage of multi-jurisdictional 
footprints and loose networks in contracts and organization.137 Corporate 
behavior has become less easy for national policy-makers to regulate,138 
                                                                                                                                      
leaning. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
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(2008) (lamenting the inability of economic-driven thinking to incorporate non-monetary or 
economic values in terms of moral and ethical paradigms). 
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Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139-158 (2013). 
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2006). See also SOL PICCIOTTO, REGULATING GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITALISM 155-206 
(2011). 
 138 See, e.g., William Magnuson, Unilateral Corporate Regulation, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
521-572 (2016); Peter J. Spiro, Constraining Global Corporate Power: A Short 
Introduction, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1101-1118 (2013); Kenneth M. Amaeshi et al., 
Corporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chains of Global Brands: A Boundaryless 
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while the same policy-makers design regulatory regimes to compete in 
global regulatory competition139 even if strong and extra-territorial 
legislation can be affected.140 There is a lack of international law to govern 
multinational corporate behavior,141 and regulatory arbitrage142 by 
corporations has flourished in the slow progress towards international 
harmonization.143 
Regulatory obligations may be regarded as boundaries for arbitrage, 
and litigation expenses or regulatory fines as a price for doing business. For 
example, a profit-chasing culture in many financial firms generated 
                                                                                                                                      
117 J. BUS. ETHICS 387-395 (2013); Tim Büthe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy: 
A (P)Review, 12 BUS. & POL. 1-38 (2010). 
 139 I.e., being in the market for rules of incorporation and doing business, see Colin 
Crouch, The Global Firm: The Problem of the Giant Firm in Democratic Capitalism, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 148. There is a lack 
of empirical evidence on whether and to what extent “exit” by corporations cause regulatory 
competition anxieties for states, as states may respond to a perceived threat whether real or 
otherwise, see Henry Tjiong, Breaking the Spell of Regulatory Competition: Reframing the 
Problem of Regulatory Exit, 66 RABEL J. COMP. & INT’L PRIV. L. 66, 75-76 (2002). 
 140 Such as the pre-1980s initiatives in the US, including e.g., the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 1977 and Alien Tort Claims Act dating to the 18th century, and modern 
exterritorial environment and other legislation. The effectiveness is discussed in Susan C. 
Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law: Extraterritoriality and the 
National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65 INT’L ORG. 745-770 (2011). 
Magnuson discusses the oft-ignored effectiveness of such unilateral regulation as 
representing political will and power to control corporate conduct, based on “effects” 
doctrines and extra-territoriality, see Magnuson, supra note 138, at 521-572. 
 141 Susan C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law: 
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65 INT’L 
ORG. 745-770 (2011). 
 142 Regulatory arbitrage often allows corporations to move their externalities to 
jurisdictions with lowest standards or least susceptible to regulatory or civil enforcement. 
See on environmental pollution, Harland Prechel & Lu Zheng, Corporate Characteristics, 
Political Embeddedness and Environmental Pollution by Large U.S. Corporations, 90 SOC. 
FORCES 947-970 (2012); and on civil liability, see generally, Robin F. Hansen, Multinational 
Enterprise Pursuit of Minimized Liability: Law, International Business Theory and the 
Prestige Oil Spill, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 410-451 (2008). This is in a large part made 
possible by the lack of an enterprise liability doctrine in the U.K., which strictly treats each 
company in a corporate group as its own legal person and it is rare for the corporate 
personality of a subsidiary to be treated as the parent’s or for the corporate group to be 
treated as having a shared personality. See Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] 2 WLR 657; 
Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34. Further, innovative structuration such as 
outsourcing and networks have changed multinational operations, allowing them to maintain 
a powerful global footprint while minimizing obligations to stakeholders, see Glenn Morgan, 
The Multinational as a Corporate Form: A Critical Contribution from Organization Studies, 
THE CORPORATION, supra note 123, at 248-56. 
 143 Lawrence Tshuma, Hierarchies and Government Versus Networks and Governance: 
Competing Regulatory Paradigms in Global Economic Regulation, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 
115, 142 (2000); Camerra-Rowe & Egan, supra note 119, at 404; Tim Büthe & Walter 
Mattli, International Standards and Standard Setting Bodies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 440-71. 
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perverse incentives towards excessive risk-taking,144 culminating in the 
global financial crisis 2007-2009, and was also prevalent in the scandal of 
fictitious bank accounts in Wells Fargo.145 Many also regard the BP 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster in 2010 as reflecting failures in 
organizational culture which prized cost-reduction over human safety.146 
In an “a-socialized” paradigm, companies can pursue myopic and 
economically driven relations with their constituents as long as financial 
efficiency is achieved. If employee-firm relations are insularly treated as 
economic and marketized, issues such as wage advancement and justice 
would be contractual bargaining147 and not framed as issues of “social 
relations.” Further, stakeholders have found it challenging to advance their 
participation or voice in the corporate law framework underpinned by 
shareholder primacy. For example, one of the hallmarks of the liberal 
market economy in the U.K. is an open market for corporate control. The 
company is free to sell out to takeover offerors that meet with shareholder 
approval. Even if stakeholders, such as employees and suppliers, are most 
affected by such decisions, they have no place for strategic participation in 
such decisions.148 The dominantly marketized framing for corporate 
conduct and decisions crowds out perspectives from a social point of view. 
In accordance with the trends of different labor markets, U.K. companies 
                                                          
 144 Michael A. Santoro & Ronald J. Strauss, WALL STREET VALUES: BUSINESS ETHICS 
AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS chapters 1-2 (2012); Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the 
Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture and Ethics 
of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209-1246 (2011); also official reports that 
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Graeme Baber, Changing Banking for Good: No More Recklessness Misconduct, 34 COMP. 
L. 340-347 (2013); ANTHONY SALZ, THE SALZ REVIEW at paragraphs 8.13-30 (2013) (on 
Barclay’s aggressive trading culture). An overview is provided in IRIS H-Y CHIU, 
REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL IN BANKS 
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS at chapter 5 (2015). 
 145 Kevin McCoy, Wells Fargo Fined $185M for Fake Accounts; 5,300 Were Fired, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/09/08/wells-
fargo-fined-185m-over-unauthorized-accounts/90003212/ (on a scandal dating back over 10 
years where employees were perversely incentivized to churn out fake bank accounts in 
order to claim performance-based remuneration). 
 146 CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE BP CATASTROPHE: WHEN HOBBLED LAW AND 
HOLLOW REGULATION LEAVE AMERICANS UNPROTECTED 1-24 (2011). 
 147 Inequalities of power can affect contractual bargaining, and can result in “vicious 
spirals” in terms of the position of the disadvantaged party, see Michael Galanis, Vicious 
Spirals in Corporate Governance: Mandatory Rules for Systemic (Re)Balancing?, 31 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 327-363 (2011). 
 148 For example, the board neutrality rule upheld in the U.K. that prevents directors from 
defending the bid and to recommend to shareholders only for their exclusive decision what is 
in the best interests of the company, Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254, and more 
recently the Kraft takeover of Cadbury Plc in the U.K., see discussion in Georgina Tsagas, A 
Long-Term Vision for UK Firms? Revisiting the Target Director’s Advisory Role Since the 
Takeover of Cadbury’s PLC, 14 J. CORP. L. STUD. 241-275 (2014). 
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are free to maintain low wages for medium to low level employees149 while 
giving in to inflated executive compensation.150 A marketized framing of 
such disparities in reward would not allow U.S. to compare apples to 
oranges in terms of the different wage markets. However, a social framing 
of the disparities in reward would raise the query why the corporate-profit 
pie, which is the product of all workers, should be distributed 
disproportionately to favor executives and management. 
A marketized framing for corporate conduct and decisions can also 
tolerate certain amoral behavior if private contracts have been entered 
freely in the market. Sharp commercial practices that do not fall within 
consumer regulation may be pursued, such as mis selling to commercial 
albeit less sophisticated parties,151 or putting suppliers on insecure terms.152 
The case of Newton-Sealey v. ArmorGroup Services Ltd & Ors153 illustrates 
how corporations can legally structure employment relations in such a way 
as to minimize risks for them while being disengaged from the needs of 
personal and social justice. In the case, a retired army officer in the U.K. 
was recruited to provide risky security services in a post-conflict zone in 
Iraq. The contract was framed to be between the ArmorGroup’s Jersey 
company and the individual because the Jersey company could exclude 
liability for negligence in causing personal injury or death. Although the 
U.K. provides consumer protection law outlawing such exclusion clauses, 
the individual was subject to less protection under Jersey law, the choice of 
law made possible for the corporation due to its multi-jurisdictional 
footprint. The individual who was ultimately injured while on duty could 
not obtain any compensation from the Jersey or the U.K. parent company. 
The legitimacy, albeit sharpness of the commercial practice of limiting 
business risks for the parent company, was upheld because the parent 
company was free to organize its economic relations and business risks 
                                                          
 149 Wage stagnation is discussed in INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, COMM’N ON ECON. 
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 150 Reported as early as 2000, see Martin J. Conyon & Joachim Schwalbach, Executive 
Compensation: Evidence from the UK and Germany, 33 LONG RANGE PLANNING 504-526 
(2000). For modern evidence, see Guido Ferrarini et al., Executive Remuneration in Crisis: 
A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 73-118 (2010). 
 151 Such as the selling of interest rate swaps to small businesses by banks, a commercial 
practice that is heavily criticized but which small businesses nevertheless cannot get redress 
in court under regulatory or private law, see Crestsign Ltd v. National Westminster Bank Plc, 
The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2014] EWHC 3043 (Ch); Bailey & Anor v. Barclays Bank 
Plc [2014] EWHC 2882 (QB). 
 152 Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann, The Social Constitution of Trust: Supplier 
Relations in Britain and Germany, 17 ORG. STUD. 365-395 (1996); and the American take 
on the relations between firms and suppliers in a liberal market economy as compared to a 
stakeholder economy is studied in Susan Helper, Comparative Supplier Relations in the US 
and Japanese Auto Industries: An Exit/Voice Approach, 19 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 153-162, 
(1990). 
 153 Newton-Sealey v. Armor Group Cos. [2008] EWHC 233 (QB). 
An Institutional Theory of Corporate Regulation 
39:85 (2019) 
111 
within the available company law framework. The limitation of corporate 
liability by strategic structuring within corporate groups is often not 
successfully challenged by tort victims because the U.K. lacks a doctrine of 
enterprise liability. Although courts have been able to uphold a parent 
company’s duty of care to subsidiary employees directly affected by their 
policies, when applied to subsidiaries, such a duty of care does not easily 
arise, and there is no general doctrine of enterprise liability.154 
Further, by maintaining the insular, private, and business-focused 
nature of corporate law, the company can remain impervious to 
distributional issues while governments face limitations in their options for 
affecting distributional justice. The liberal market economy is a capitalist 
order apt to produce distributive inequalities.155 Although such inequalities 
reflect differences in reward for different forms of enterprise or economic 
behavior,156 it is another matter to find tolerable the “politically and socially 
offensive”157 levels of inequality that have come about in neo-liberal, 
financialized economies such as the U.S. and U.K.158 where the 
distributional differences between “winners” and “losers”159 can be 
phenomenal.160 For example, companies have financially jeopardized 
pension schemes to the disadvantage of employees while giving in to 
market pressures and paying out dividends to shareholders while pension 
pots are still in deficit. 161 These loci of distributional injustices are now 
                                                          
 154 Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525; Ogale Community & Ors v Royal 
Dutch Shell Plc & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 191. 
 155 ROGER BOOTLE, THE TROUBLE WITH MARKETS: SAVING CAPITALISM FROM ITSELF 66-
92 (Nicholas Brealey Publishing 2012). 
 156 Such as argued in ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, CAPITALISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE 95-169 (Peter J. Boettke & Frédéric Sautet eds., 2016). 
 157 HAY & PAYNE, supra note 22, at 42. 
 158 BOOTLE, supra note 155, at 66-92; Geoff Mulgan, The Essence of Capitalism, in THE 
LOCUST AND THE BEE: PREDATORS AND CREATORS IN CAPITALISM’S FUTURE 28-51 (2013); 
Greta Krippner, Accumulation and the Profits of Finance, in FINANCIALIZATION AT WORK, 
supra note 109, at 191–208. 
 159 The competitive and non-collaborative ethos in market capitalism is heavily criticized 
in R. Edward Freeman et al., Stakeholder Capitalism, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS 303-314 (2007) 
(arguing for a more co-operative, long-termism, and gain-sharing form of capitalism). 
 160 Prompting economists such as Amartya Sen to articulate the need for economic 
justice to be prized above the relentless logic of liberal market freedoms. See, Amartya Sen, 
Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in 
Promoting Individual Freedoms, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 519-541, (1993); Zafar Iqbal et 
al., The Current Crisis of Capitalism, 9 POL’Y PERSP. 65-86 (2012). 
 161 The shift from defined benefit occupational pensions to defined contribution which 
exposes employees to the risks of financial investment over the long-term. See, PENSIONS 
POLICY INST., THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF PENSION SCHEMES IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN 
THE UK 17 (2012); John Broadbent et al., The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined 
Contribution Pension Plans – Implications for Asset Allocation and Risk Management, BIS, 
Dec. 2006, at 11-21 (providing aggregate observations on Australia, Canada and U.S. and 
the British Home Stores collapse which exposes the possibility of companies paying 
inordinate dividends at the expense of huge pension deficits). See also HOUSE OF COMMONS 
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attracting policy attention, as Section II discusses.162 Market primacy 
cannot address such inequalities as market prices are often flawed and do 
not reflect perfectly social cost.163 In relation to the Newton-Sealey case 
above, the wages paid to the employee arguably do not fully internalize the 
risks to the individual and his family. 
It is arguable that the very social good of having corporate forms 
organize productive economic activity is itself becoming questionable as 
corporate and market behavior threaten to erode this. This problem is 
explored in Kay’s 2012 review164 undertaken for the British government 
with regard to how long-termism, i.e. the social good of corporate wealth 
creation for the long-term (for all economic constituents such as savers, 
employees, etc.) is being undermined by stock market short-termism.165 As 
investors “discipline” corporations by exit or voice depending on quarterly 
corporate performance, corporate strategies become attuned to the short-
term and are excessively financially driven, undermining visions and 
strategic investment for the long term. 166 
The three tenets of corporate regulation are limited in addressing the 
social disapproval of corporate behavior, as the limits of regulation are most 
sharply felt where social objectives are in conflict with market-based 
incentives. By leaving markets to achieve their allocative purposes, 
governments have a limited arsenal in addressing social inequalities or 
bimoral (but legal) behavior perpetuated by the corporate sector. Bruner167 
argues that the essentially private, shareholder-centric model of company 
law is socially accepted in the U.K. as social concerns need not be mediated 
through corporate law. He points to the existence of the welfare state and 
                                                                                                                                      
WORK & PENSIONS & BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS COMMS., BHS: FIRST REPORT OF THE 
WORK AND PENSION COMMITTEE AND FOURTH REPORT OF THE BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND 
SKILLS COMMITTEE OF SESSION 2016-17, 2016, HC 54, at 13 (UK). 
 162 DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM: 
THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE GREEN PAPER CONSULTATION, 2007, at 8-52 (looking at 
pay gaps within corporations). Pensions protection is also being consulted upon, so that 
pension trustees may be more empowered to give voice to the protection of pension schemes 
where companies contemplate strategic changes. See DEP’T FOR WORK & PENSIONS, 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION ON PROTECTING DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION 
SCHEMES – A STRONGER PENSIONS REGULATOR, 2018, at 19-28. 
 163 JOHN PLENDER, CAPITALISM: MONEY, MORALS AND MARKETS 277-309 (2015). 
 164 JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION 
MAKING: FINAL REPORT at paragraph 2.16 (2012). 
 165 THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE 
APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT at 2 (2009). 
 166 Caitlin Helms et al., Corporate Short-Termism: Causes and Remedies, 23 INT’L 
COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 45-54 (2012); Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short-
Termism and Managerial Myopia, 100 KY. L.J. 531-584 (2011). This short-termism, whose 
flip side is dynamism and innovation is also noted in Vitols, 
supra note 78, at 337-60. 
 167 Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the ‘Anglo-American’ Corporation, 50 
VA. J. INT’L L. 579-622 (2010). 
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social policy regulations in the U.K. as providing adequately for social 
concerns, therefore leaving free corporate law and governance to serve the 
needs of the private economic enterprise of the company. The government’s 
ability to use fiscal and welfare state measures168 has become increasingly 
limited in the face of the austerity measures imposed after the global 
financial crisis.169 The lacunae and deficiencies of corporate regulation are 
being exposed for not significantly moderating a-social and bimoral 
behavior on the part of corporations. 170 
Section II turns to the drivers that challenge the stability of regulatory 
capitalism. 
II. REGULATORY CAPITALISM CHALLENGED 
In this Section, we argue that two major drivers exert pressure towards 
shifts in the tenets of regulatory capitalism. First, the rise of a diffuse space 
for voices (whether of a public/regulatory or social/business nature) that 
articulate perspectives on CSR, influencing policy and law for corporations. 
Second, the onset of the global financial crisis 2007-2009 has introduced 
political disruptions that have had aftershock effects upon corporate 
regulation and reform. 
A. The Rise of Transnational Private Governance, Multi-Stakeholder 
Initiatives, and New Governance 
Civil society forces, such as the rise of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs),171 have assumed an increasingly important voice in 
pushing for changes in corporate behavior, articulating the need for 
corporations to assume responsibility commensurate with their social power 
and footprint172 and the need for corporations to act as “social citizens” 
                                                          
 168 Such as the working tax credit which has been introduced under the New Labour 
government and generally positively evaluated. See Mike Brewer et al., Did Working 
Families’ Tax Credit Work? Analysing the Impact of In-Work Support on Labour Supply and 
Programme Participation, INLAND REVENUE, Dec. 2003, at 1. 
 169 As national debt was raised to bail-out U.K. banks, the budget deficit became hugely 
challenging and austerity was introduced. See Ashley Seager & Julia Kollewe, Bank Bail-
Out ‘Could Send National Debt Soaring By £1.5 Trillion’, GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2009), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/feb/19/national-debt-lloyds-hbos. 
 170 Grietje Baars, “Reform or Revolution”? Polanyian Versus Marxian Perspectives on 
the Regulation of the Economic, 62 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 415-431 (2011). 
 171 Jonathan P. Doh & Terrence R. Guay, Globalization and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: How Non-Governmental Organizations Influence Labor and Environmental 
Codes of Conduct, 44 MGMT. INT’L REV. 7-29, (2004); Robert J. Bies et al., Introduction to 
Special Topic Forum: Corporations as Social Change Agents: Individual, Interpersonal, 
Institutional, and Environmental Dynamics, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 788 -793 (2007); 
Dorothea Baur & Guido Palazzo, The Moral Legitimacy of NGOs as Partners of 
Corporations, 21 BUS. ETHICS Q. 579-604 (2011). 
 172 Peter Newell, Citizenship, Accountability and Community: The Limits of the CSR 
Agenda, 81 INT’L AFF. 541-557 (2005); Rogers Tabe Egbe Orock, Less-Told Stories About 
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beyond legal compliance.173 These voices are especially critical of 
multinational corporations’ exploitation of regulatory arbitrage, benefiting 
from lightly-regulated jurisdictions, corrupt governments, etc. Even as they 
introduce investment and economic opportunities, they also exploit 
resources and externalize social harm.174 Civil society voices have arisen in 
gaps in the transnational sphere where there is a lack of global corporate 
regulation either at an international level or in terms of strong (and often) 
extra-territorial regulation by nation states.175 
In this transnational space, a variety of actors offer voice, both critical 
and constructive, as well as pro-active initiatives to influence corporate 
behavior. The space was first dominated by states, international 
organizations, networks of regulators and industry associations,176 but is 
increasingly populated by third-party standard-setting bodies, civil society 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, collectively forming a 
polycentric space177 for influence and interactions. Technological 
                                                                                                                                      
Corporate Globalization: Transnational Corporations and CSR as the Politics of 
(Ir)Responsibility in Africa, 37 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27-50 (2013); David Vogel, 
Taming Globalization? Civil Regulation and Corporate Capitalism, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 472-94. 
 173 ANDREW CRANE ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP: BUSINESS, RESPONSIBILITY 
AND SOCIETY 1-14 (2008); Jeremy Moon et al., Corporations and Citizenship in New 
Institutions of Global Governance, in THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATION IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 203-24 (Colin Crouch & Camilla Maclean eds., 2011); Peter Edward & Hugh 
Willmott, Corporate Citizenship: Rise or Demise of a Myth?, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 771, 
771-73 (2008). 
 174 JANET DINE, Transnationals Out of Control, in THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE 
GROUPS 151-75 (2000). 
 175 Tshuma, supra note 143, at 115, 142. 
 176 See PICCIOTTO, supra note 137, at 9-16, 50-60, 61-107. 
 177 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance 
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342-470 (2004); Louise G. Trubek, New 
Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 170 (2006). 
Catǻ Backer refers to the rise of bottom-up voices in the governance space as movement of 
“social aggregation” or “social constitutionalism,” establishing socially-led organizations as 
having a participative voice and rights in transnational governance. See Larry Catá Backer, 
Transnational Corporations Outward Expression of Inward Self-Constitution: The 
Enforcement of Human Rights by Apple, Inc., 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 805-879 
(2013). A range of polycentric actors and their influences: third-party initiatives that may 
influence corporate behavioral change include lender governance such as under the Equator 
Principles athttps://equator-principles.com. But see critique in Douglas Sarro, Do Lenders 
Make Effective Regulators? An Assessment of the Equator Principles on Project Finance, 13 
GERMAN L.J. 1525-1558, (2012) (relating to lack of monitoring and governance, therefore 
making lender governance a procedural and superficial phenomenon that lenders can brand 
themselves by); see also Niamh O’Sullivan & Brendan O’Dwyer, Stakeholder Perspectives 
on a Financial Sector Legitimation Process: The Case of NGOs and the Equator Principles, 
22 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 553-87 (2009); Patrick Haack et al., Exploring 
the Constitutive Conditions for a Self-Energizing Effect of CSR Standards: The Case of the 
‘Equator Principles’ 4-33 (University of Zurich Institute of Organization and Administrative 
Science IOU Working Paper No. 115, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
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modernization has played no small part in facilitating the social 
organization and cooperation for common causes nationally and 
internationally, due to the fall in the cost of communications. In this space, 
various initiatives of a voluntary nature have been developed to secure 
corporate commitment to certain standards or conduct. These initiatives 
include agenda-setting for policy change; standard-setting for products, 
services or conduct; labeling of organizations or their output; certification 
of organizations or their output; auditor organizations; procedural 
governance; and dialogic mechanisms.178 As many of the initiatives differ 
                                                                                                                                      
abstract_id=1706267. Many programs of third party certification and monitoring such as 
SA8000, the Ethical Trading Initiative, the Marine and Forest Stewardship Councils 
initiatives, the ISO14000 for environmental management, etc., have attained credibility due 
to independent monitoring. See Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry 
Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515-2549 (2013); Kees Bastmeijer & Jonathan 
Verschuuren, NGO-Business Collaborations and the Law: Sustainability, Limitations of the 
Law, and the Changing Relationship Between Companies and NGOs, in CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 314-29 (Istemi 
Demirag ed., 2005); Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental 
Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1-29 (2003); David A. 
Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: Private Voluntary Standards as 
Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79-102 (2009); PRAKASH & POTOSKI, 
supra note 116, at 81-188. There is also a critique of inspectors’ lack of business experience 
and susceptibility to be fooled by superficial compliance. See Petra Christmann & Glen 
Taylor, Firm Self-Regulation Through International Certifiable Standards: Determinants of 
Symbolic Versus Substantive Implementation, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 863-878 (2006). Other 
voluntary initiatives include industry voluntary standards, which may be credible as being 
bottom-up and overcome the collective action problem, and that facilitate learning and 
internalization. See Chang-Hsien Tsai & Yen-Nung Wu, What Conflict Minerals Rules Tell 
Us About the Legal Transplantation of Corporate Social Responsibility Standards Without 
the State: From the United Nations to the United States to Taiwan, 38 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
233-284 (2018) (on the significant acceptance of the Electronic Industry Citizenship 
Coalition (EICC) industry standards for monitoring conflict minerals sourcing); Bindu Arya 
& Jane E. Salk, Cross-Sector Alliance Learning and Effectiveness of Voluntary Codes of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 211-234 (2006). Civil society pressure 
and engagement is also important on an ad hoc basis. See Doreen McBarnet, Corporate 
Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: The New Corporate 
Accountability 1-63 (University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No. 2009/03, 
2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1369305; Vogel, supra note 
172, at 472-94. See David Nerserssian, Business Lawyers as Worldwide Moral Gatekeepers? 
Legal Ethics and Human Rights in Global Corporate Practice, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1135-1187 (2015) (on external legal counsel who could also act as gatekeepers to change 
corporate behavior in view of increasing legal risk in relation to the matters of CSR). But the 
ambivalence of the moral compass of legal advisors is comprehensively canvassed in 
RICHARD MOORHEAD ET AL., MAPPING THE MORAL COMPASS: THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
IN-HOUSE LAWYERS’ ROLE, PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATIONS, TEAM CULTURES, 
ORGANISATIONAL PRESSURES, ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND ETHICAL INCLINATION 4-122 
(2016) at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2784758; David Kershaw & 
Richard Moorhead, Consequential Responsibility for Client Wrongs: Lehman Brothers and 
the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 76 MOD. L. REV. 26-61 (2013). 
 178 A typology of these “private governance” initiatives is explored in Tracey M. 
Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A Functional Typology of Private Governance 
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from traditional regulatory law in terms of the nature of “obligation” 
imposed, the “precision” of such obligation or the “enforcement” of such 
obligation,179 they are characterized as “soft law.” A soft law typically 
mimics but does not fully attain the traditional characteristics of state-based 
regulation.180 Many commentators have increasingly called upon the 
recognition of this body of soft law as “transnational private regulation,”181 
consolidating its “lawness” as a pluralist development in law,182 so that its 
causes may be advanced and not obstructed by traditional frames for law 
and legality.183 
The polycentric governance space and diverse soft law instruments for 
securing change in corporate behavior constitute a “transnational” new 
                                                                                                                                      
Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 67-144 (2011). See also Fabrizio Cafaggi & 
Andrea Renda, Public and Private Regulation: Mapping the Labyrinth, 1 DQ 16-29 (2012); 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transmittal New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 501-578 (2009). 
 179 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421-456 (2000) (in which is offered the paradigm spectrum for 
characterizing hard or soft law based on the qualities of precision, binding-ness and 
enforcement). Even if standards may be specific, the lack of enforcement authority or an 
adjudicatory forum would still likely render such standards as soft law. 
 180 Alexia Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1-69 (2016); Harri 
Kalim & Tim Staal, “Softness” in International Instruments: The Case of Transnational 
Corporations, 41 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 257-334 (2014). 
 181 Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 20-49 (2011); Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of 
Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 1-19 (2011). 
 182 This is advanced by a number of commentators who advocate a broad definition of 
law that is not traditionally constrained and more porous to other disciplines such as 
sociology, political science, or anthropology in achieving the securing of commitment to 
behavioral change. The de-legalized framing of such initiatives would further reinforce their 
lack of effectiveness, and acknowledgement of their function, effect and near-law profile is 
more constructive towards governance ends. See Larry Catá Backer, Governance 
Polycentrism – Hierarchy and Order Without Government in Business and Human Rights 
Regulation 1-27 (Coalition for Peace and Ethics Working Paper No. 1/1, 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2373734; see also Larry Catá Backer, 
Theorizing Regulatory Governance Within its Ecology: The Structure of Management in an 
Age of Globalization, 24 J. CONTEMP. POL. 607-630 (2018); Larry Catá Backer, A Lex 
Mercatoria for Corporate Social Responsibility Codes Without the State? A Critique of 
Legalization Within the State Under the Premises of Globalization, 24 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL 
STUD. 115-145 (2017); Larry Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and 
the Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 101-148 
(2008); Neil Walker & Gráinne de Búrca, Reconceiving Law and New Governance 2-17 
(EUI Working Paper Law No. 2007/10, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=987180; Peer 
Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 141-189 (2010); 
Peer Zumbansen, Lochner Disembedded: The Anxieties of Law in a Global Context, 20 IND. 
J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 29-69 (2013) (citations omitted). 
 183 Zumbansen, supra note 182, at 141-189; Christine Parker, The Pluralization of 
Regulation, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 349-369 (2008). 
An Institutional Theory of Corporate Regulation 
39:85 (2019) 
117 
governance,184 which is characterized by diversity, inclusiveness, 
participation, interrelationships,185 and the socialization of the corporation 
within this fabric.186 Commentators view the development of this space as 
crucially enrolling the “social” dimension into governance of corporate 
behavior, so that such governance is not narrowly dominated by 
government and business.187 In this manner, firm insularity can be opened 
up, and corporate accountability may be multi-channeled and widely 
scoped,188 instead of narrowly focusing on markets and investors. There is 
increasingly recognition of the potency of such bottom-up pressures.189 
                                                          
 184 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 178, at 501-578. 
 185 Neil Gunningham, Regulatory Reform and Reflexive Regulation: Beyond Command 
and Control, in REFLEXIVE GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS, 85-104 (Eric 
Brousseau et al. eds., 2012); and generally new governance techniques, see Karin 
Buhmann, Reflexive Regulation of CSR to Promote Sustainability: Understanding EU 
Public-Private Regulation on CSR through the Case of Human Rights, 8 INT’L & COMP. 
CORP. L. J. 38-76 (2011); Stavros Gadinis, Three Pathways to Global Standards: Private, 
Regulator, and Ministry Networks, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 1-57 (2015); Ronen Shamir, Socially 
Responsible Private Regulation: World-Culture or World-Capitalism?, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
313-336 (2011). 
 186 Heiko Spitzeck, Organizational Moral Learning: What, If Anything, Do Corporations 
Learn from NGO Critique?, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 157-173 (2009) (on how organizations are 
compelled to adopt learning in social and not merely individualistically-driven dimensions). 
 187 Bettina Lange & Fiona Haines, Introduction, in REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS: 
RETHINKING ECONOMY-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS 1-30 (Bettina Lange et al. eds., 2015); 
Alexander Ebner, The Regulation of Markets: Polanyian Perspectives, in REGULATORY 
TRANSFORMATIONS: RETHINKING ECONOMY-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS, supra, at 31-53. At a 
broader level, the socialization of the governance sphere is consistent with the holistic nature 
of markets that Polanyi championed- socially embedded markets instead of markets driven 
on narrow economic logics devoid of a full sense of humanity in participation. 
 188 Andreas Rasche et al., Complete and Partial Organizing for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 115 J. BUS. ETHICS 651-663 (2013) discusses the changing landscape of 
“organizing” governance, and Mueckenberger & Jastram, supra note 16, at 223-239 
(discusses the transnational governance space of networks and coalitions). It is noted that the 
rise of third party monitors, auditors, etc. from civil society quarters such as NGOs have 
become a real force in the governance space. See Bastmeijer & Verschuuren, supra note 
177, at 314-29; Henrik Lindholm et al., Do Code of Conduct Audits Improve Chemical 
Safety in Garment Factories? Lessons on Corporate Social Responsibility in the Supply 
Chain from Fair Wear Foundation, 22 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 283-291 
(2016); Gay W. Seidman, Regulation at Work: Globalization, Labor Rights, and 
Development, 79 SOC. RES. 1023-1044 (2012). 
 189 Empirical research does document the importance of organized civil society demand, 
characterized as an institutional factor that drives companies to respond to CSR demands. 
See Laura P. Hartman et al., The Communication of Corporate Social Responsibility: United 
States and European Union Multinational Corporations, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS 373-389 (2007); 
David Antony Detomasi, The Political Roots of Corporate Social Responsibility, 82 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 807-819 (2008); Ulf Henning Richter, Drivers of Change: A Multiple-Case Study on 
the Process of Institutionalization of Corporate Responsibility Among Three Multinational 
Companies, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 261-279 (2011). Even in relation to traditional welfare states 
that may be on the cusp of change, civil society voices for CSR are getting corporate 
attention. See Hans De Geer et al., Reconciling CSR with the Role of the Corporation in 
Welfare States: The Problematic Swedish Example, 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 269-283 (2009). 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 39:85 (2019) 
118 
Civil society groups have successfully become part of many multi-
stakeholder initiatives that shape corporate behavior,190 albeit in an 
essentially contested space for governance. These initiatives are important 
as they bring social dimensions to bear more forcefully than where soft law 
initiatives are shaped by corporations and industry alone.191 
Such institutional movements have been keenly noted by business. 
Concomitantly, businesses have also participated in the conceptualization 
of CSR in order to frame it towards their interest.192 This conceptual and 
intellectual stalemate193 is reflected in a “governance” or political 
stalemate,194 as neither social forces nor businesses have fully captured the 
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Relationships Through Stakeholder Dialogue, 113 J. BUS. ETHICS 505-518 (2013); Fairbrass 
& Zueva-Owens, supra note 16, at 321-335; and more precisely in Doh & Guay, supra note 
171, at 7-29. NGOs are not consistently involved in dialogue and change processes and the 
risks of their marginalization remain strong. Further where civil society actors interact with 
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supply-chains; BSCI 10th Anniversary Shame Over Rana Plaza, CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN 
(June 25, 2013), https://cleanclothes.org/news/2013/06/25/bsci-10th-anniversary-shame-
over-rana-plaza. 
 192 Krista Bondy et al., An Institution of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Multi-
National Corporations (MNCs): Form and Implications, 111 J. BUS. ETHICS 281-299 (2012). 
 193 Shallini S. Taneja et al., Researches in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of 
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192 (2012) (discussing how businesses have developed “challenger” business associations-
led approaches to rival multi-stakeholder governance initiatives). 
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definition of CSR.195 Businesses have sought to characterize CSR as being 
consistent with the business case, whether financially-defined196 or wider.197 
Businesses have also framed CSR as a new management and self-regulatory 
tool198 that is purportedly more effective199 or efficient200 than government 
                                                          
 195 Taneja et al., supra note 193, at 343-364. 
 196 These relate to conventional financial performance, see Manuel Castelo Branco & 
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Performance, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1101-1122 (2006). Other studies find a negative 
correlation. See, e.g., Stephen Brammer et al., Corporate Social Performance and Stock 
Returns: UK Evidence from Disaggregate Measures, 35 FIN. MGMT. 97-116 (2006); 
Leonardo Bechetti & Rocco Ciciretti, Corporate Social Responsibility and Stock Market 
Performance, Applied Financial Economics, 2009, vol. 19, issue 16, 1283-1293. 
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15, 46-74 (2005). 
 198 Kunal Basu & Guido Palazzo, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Process Model of 
Sensemaking, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 122-136 (2008) (discussing how overall “sense-
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González & Carmen Valor Martinez, Fostering Corporate Social Responsibility Through 
Public Initiative: From the EU to the Spanish Case, 55 J. BUS. ETHICS 275-293 (2004) 
(discussing how CSR is merely managerial and procedural in Spanish companies); and 
similar findings for Serbian companies, see Ivana S. Mijatovic & Dusan Stokic, The 
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regulation, due to the transnational nature of these issues and the disparities 
in regulatory capacity between states at different points of political and 
economic development.201 
In this ideological contest over CSR, we see the intractability of the 
debates between delineated responsibility and maximal responsibility for 
corporations,202 and between regulation and self-regulation,203 both of 
which seem to have become a fixture in the political economy of CSR. 
Commentators remain in an equilibrium of disagreement on the 
characterization of corporate citizenship,204 corporate purpose,205 and the 
means to change corporate behavior.206 Such intractability can be illustrated 
                                                          
 201 Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social 
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37. 
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25 (2006); Robert McCorquodale, Towards More Effective Legal Implementation of 
Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights, 103 PROC. ASIL ANN. MEETING 
288-291 (2009); Mahmood Monshipouri et al., Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of 
Global Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 965-989 (2003), but on 
the limits of regulation, see Gregory A. Daneke, Regulation and the Sociopathic Firm, 10 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 15-20 (1985); and on behavioral impediments to self-
regulation, see Charles R. Greer & H. Kirk Downey, Industrial Compliance with Social 
Legislation: Investigations of Decision Rationales, 7 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 488-498 (1982). 
 204 See Pierre-Yves Néron & Wayne Norman, CITIZENSHIP, INC.: Do We Really Want 
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Reality, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 51-94 (2008); Andrew Crane & Dirk Matten, Incorporating the 
Corporation in Citizenship: A Response to Néron and Norman, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 27-33, 
(2008). 
 205 Friedman, supra note 131, as against David Windsor, Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Three Key Approaches, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 93-114 (2006); KEAY, supra note 
72, at 173, 177-83. 
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law. See supra, note 181. 
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by reference to the development of corporate codes of ethics that seem to 
respond to and incorporate social demands, yet are self-regulating in nature. 
Many commentators argue that corporate codes of ethics are not merely 
based on internal values but recognize and incorporate external standards, 
such as standards forged by international organizations.207 Corporate codes 
of ethics are an embodiment of polycentric governance influences, 
culminating in soft law instruments that regulate corporations 
themselves.208 However, empirical research has persistently found 
inconsistency in the corporate implementation of and adherence to such 
codes, reflecting the dilemmas corporations face in their “bimoral” 
dimensions and their uncertain positioning in relation to social spheres.209 
The intractability in characterizing CSR and its impetus for change could 
perpetuate decades of debate and discourse without entailing any structural 
changes to the political economy or nature of regulatory capitalism, and 
indeed corporate behavior. 
The claim to institutional change, though observed, is slow.210 It is also 
naïve to think that the polycentric governance space is a harmonious one. 
The polycentric governance space is ridden with contests in ideology, 
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See Gunther Teubner, Corporate Codes in the Varieties of Capitalism: How Their 
Enforcement Depends on the Differences Among Production Regimes, 24 IND. J. GLOB. 
LEGAL STUD. 81-97 (2017); Gunther Teubner & Anna Beckers, Expanding 
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487 (2010). Some commentators argue that such codes are ineffective because of the 
enforcement deficit is key to the ineffectiveness of such codes, see Li-Wen Lin, Legal 
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NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW at chapter 4 (2015) (arguing such codes should be enforced in 
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values, power, and methodology. Civil society organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and other socially-led groups do not have 
consonant voices or common agendas with each other or with state-led 
international organizations211 and corporate-led industry associations. They 
also face conflicts of interests themselves.212 Business, as depicted above, 
also influences the discourse strongly. There is a lack of clear authoritative 
or coordinative order in this governance space, and the flourishing of 
myriad forms of soft law has not always translated into roadmaps for 
empirical implementation of changes to corporate behavior. 
B. Mixed Achievements Observed in the U.K. 
The emerging nature of transnational governance has produced 
incremental institutional shifts. In the U.K., corporations are increasingly 
attuned to social responsibility concerns, but these are predominantly 
framed in terms of business risk in relation to reputation and 
performance.213 Hence, policymakers introducing company law reforms in 
2006 accepted that a director’s duty to secure the success of the company 
for the benefit of shareholders as a whole includes a duty to take into 
account of relevant stakeholder-facing and social responsibility matters.214 
Investors are particularly called upon to consider “environment, social and 
governance” (ESG) matters, aligning social expectations with their 
interests.215 There is pronounced reliance on investor and market discipline 
for corporations’ ESG profiles,216 but we cannot blithely assume that 
investors act on behalf of enforcing social expectations or behave as social 
gatekeepers.217 The focus on the marketized framing for CSR has the 
potential to undermine the content of social demand in CSR. The 
marketized framing also has the effect of confining CSR to voluntary and 
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self-regulatory measures, as legalization may be regarded as inappropriate 
interventions into the “market for virtue.”218 
Policy-makers in the U.K. have been slow to consider regulatory 
policy in CSR, relying on corporate self-regulation and investor leadership 
to address corporate behavior. The agnosticism of regulators is arguably an 
important reason for the slowness of institutional change. However, policy-
makers have become interested in the innovative “new governance” 
methodologies in many soft law initiatives. When warranted, such 
techniques seem to offer innovative and possible cost-reducing ways of 
introducing corporate regulation. 
New governance methodologies are based on multi-stakeholder 
governance to change corporate behavior. 219 It is envisaged that the 
regulated subject, i.e., the corporation, would be subject to regulatory 
principles that incorporate more procedural flexibility and work with a 
variety of governance actors including regulators, markets, and stakeholders 
in securing compliance,220 potentially overcoming the short-comings of 
traditional command-and-control regulation. In the U.K., this was accepted 
by financial regulators (in line with international regulatory 
developments)221 in the area of regulating risk management by banks. 
Further, we also saw this implemented in the Corporate Homicide and 
Manslaughter Act 2007. 
The implementation of such new governance techniques in financial 
regulation has, however, resulted in spectacular regulatory failure as 
revealed in the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009. This is largely 
because new governance techniques were not implemented in a truly multi-
stakeholder fashion, and focused on investors and securities markets as 
governance actors. These have failed to exercise meaningful discipline,222 
resulting in banks being devolved with self-regulation. Banks manipulated 
the “flexible” regulatory standards to their advantage and were relatively 
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unchecked.223 
Lackluster implementation of new governance techniques in the U.K. 
can also be seen in the Corporate Homicide and Manslaughter Act 2007. 
The Act progressed through a long period of gestation since policy reform 
recommended by the Law Commission in 1996224 after a number of large-
scale accidents between 1986 and 1989 that caused significant numbers of 
deaths and injuries.225 Amidst political challenges to the policy change, the 
Law Commission’s report was not taken up until 2000 after the New 
Labour government came to power. 
The Act was ultimately passed in 2007 to introduce a corporate 
manslaughter offense for public and private corporate bodies that cause 
death due to a gross breach of a duty of care to the victims, attributed to the 
way the organization is managed or organized.226 The reform overcame the 
limitations in case law, which premised corporate liability upon an 
attribution doctrine that certain individuals’ minds and wills could be 
attributed to the corporation.227 The new regulatory technique seems able to 
interrogate the inside of the corporation in terms of poor management or 
organization that results in harmful, externally-facing conduct.228 This 
reform arguably connects a corporation’s management to the prevention of 
social harm, introducing a form of disruption to the insular and 
economically-driven model of the corporation and its governance. 229 
Nevertheless, the adoption of new governance techniques in the Act 
has not introduced profound changes to corporate behavior. First, the 
corporation remains free to determine its internal management and systems, 
and the regulatory regime does not involve multi-stakeholder input or a 
social dimension to influence corporate behavior on an ex-ante basis. 
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Second, the corporation is only called to account for its internal 
management and systems before the court when indicted for the occurrence 
of corporate homicide or manslaughter. The judicial interrogation of 
internal management and systems is ex-post in nature and has focused on 
precise pinpointing of senior management negligence.230 This narrow 
approach allows large organizations with diffuse responsibilities to more 
easily escape from liability under this regime as senior management may 
not be implicated with precise acts by employees.231 
The achievements in regulatory policy in addressing the social 
dimensions of corporate behavior have been relatively incremental before 
the onset of the global financial crisis 2007-9. The crisis and its aftermath, 
which we turn to discuss, have provided new opportunities for challenges to 
the stability of regulatory capitalism, culminating in the recent surge in the 
legalization of CSR issues discussed in Section III. 
C. Regulatory Capitalism Challenged by Global Financial Crisis and its 
Aftermath 
The global financial crisis 2007–2009 saw the near failure of a number 
of U.S., U.K., and European banks that had taken excessive risks. Many 
were exposed to liquidity risks resulting from imprudent management,232 or 
solvency risks from having complex (and ultimately toxic) securitized 
assets on their balance sheets.233 The marketized financial economy 
promotes herding in good times and excessive withdrawals in bad times,234 
exacerbating stresses already faced by financial firms.235 As financialization 
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brought about a state of private sector dominance in meeting the financial 
needs of states, business, and households,236 many states found themselves 
in a position of having to bail out significant financial institutions to prevent 
the collapse of domestic financial systems.237 The crisis led to real 
economic damage, including home foreclosures and job losses, and 
adversely affected the fiscal strength of governments, resulting in 
widespread austerity measures in the EU and U.K., and a loss of welfare.238 
Social confidence in market capitalism in the U.K. has been severely 
disturbed,239 as reflected in (a) articulations of the ideological crisis of faith 
in the U.K.’s capitalist model and (b) political disruptions in the U.K. 
echoed across many other European countries. 
The ideological crisis of faith in market capitalism has been expressed 
in intellectual calls to challenge the current model of market capitalism, in 
order to adjust towards an economic model more cognizant of the social 
needs for justice and stability.240 This is not necessarily “leftist” talk: these 
voices reflect a culmination of underlying concerns that have built up for 
years about the U.K. economy with respect to issues such as widening 
inequality between the economic elite and ordinary citizenry, 241 the 
stagnation of wages compared to profits made from financial capital,242 and 
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intermediating financial assets. 
 242 Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Financialization and U.S. Income 
Inequality, 1970–2008, 118 AM. J. SOC. 1284, 1291-95 (2013); Eckhard Hein, Finance-
Dominated Capitalism and Redistribution of Income: A Kaleckian Perspective 31-32 (Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 746, 2013); Basak Kus, 
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the marginalization of stakeholders from business and policy.243 Indeed, the 
“Occupy” movement worldwide was a reflection of social discontent that 
arose to challenge the legitimacy of the capitalist model of market 
fundamentalism that perpetuated social inequalities and divisions.244 This 
ideological crisis has not become revolutionary with worldwide crackdown 
of the Occupy movement.245 But policy-makers cognizant of the failings of 
financial markets have sought to appease the public with international 
resolve to regulate banks and financial institutions much more robustly than 
before. 246 The determination in the U.S. to bring the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 
into force, and the comprehensive program of institutional and regulatory 
reform in the EU247 and U.K.248 have found social resonance. These 
measures compel regulators to take proactive roles,249 as well as robust ex 
                                                                                                                                      
Financialisation and Income Inequality in OECD Nations: 1995-2007, 43 ECON. & SOC. 
REV. 477, 492-93 (2012); Gerard Duménil & Dominique Lévy, Financialization, Neo-
Liberalism and Income Inequality in the USA, in FINANCIALIZATION AT WORK, supra note 
109, at 225-29. 
 243 E.g., INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, COMM’N ON ECON. JUSTICE, supra note 149, at 
29-39; see also Mulgan, supra note 158, at 32-51. 
 244 ANDENAS & CHIU, supra note 109, at 3-15. 
 245 ‘Occupy Wall Street: 5 years later’ (CNN 16 Sep 2016) at https://edition.cnn.com/
2016/09/16/us/occupy-wall-street-protest-movements/index.html. 
 246 For an in-depth discussion of the EU, U.K. and international political perspectives, 
see THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Eilis Ferran et al. eds., 
2012). 
 247 The regulatory reform program is based on protecting financial stability as a social 
good of newfound importance. Measures include: controlling financial institution risk-taking 
at the micro and macro levels; bank crisis and resolution measures; increased market 
transparency and reporting for regulatory surveillance, not just market discipline; greater 
consumer protection; and intervening into the organizational governance and management of 
financial institutions, including remuneration controls. These are supported by institutional 
reform at the EU with agencies tasked with greater rule-making and supervisory powers, and 
in the U.K. with clear division of responsibilities between the Prudential Regulation and 
Financial Conduct Authorities and enhanced supervisory and enforcement arsenal. See 
ANDENAS & CHIU, supra note 109; THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 237; 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (P.M. Vasudev & Susan Watson 
eds., 2011). 
 248 The U.K. transposed most of the EU reforms but added structural reforms to end the 
“too-big-to-fail” problem. See ANDENAS & CHIU, supra note 109, at 295-331, and citations 
therein, for a discussion of the Vickers Report, which preceded the government White Paper 
and legislation. Further, the U.K. conducted a “social”-level inquiry in the form of the four 
volumes of reports under the House of Commons and House of Lords Committees to 
“[C]hang[e] banking for good.” See PARLIAMENTARY COMM’N ON BANKING STANDARDS, 
CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD (2013), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/
jtselect/jtpcbs/27/27.pdf. These inquiries played a significant part in the U.K.’s development 
and introduction of the senior managers regime, which created a near strict-liability 
regulatory framework for senior bank officers. See Iris H-Y Chiu, Regulatory Duties for 
Directors in the Financial Services Sector and Directors’ Duties in Company Law: 
Bifurcation and Interfaces, 6 J. BUS. L. 465, 474-81 (2016). 
 249 See BANK OF ENG., PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
AUTHORITY’S APPROACH TO BANKING SUPERVISION 33-37 (2013), https://www.
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post roles,250 far more than ever before in supervising banks and financial 
institutions, changing the regulatory paradigms significantly.251 This shift 
has not dethroned the private financial sector from continuing to be 
dominant in mediating worldwide financial needs for states, businesses and 
households,252 but a social truce seems to have been attained by the force of 
regulation asserting a new balance of power and legitimacy in the 
financialized market economy.253 Further, large fines imposed upon 
financial institutions for misconduct,254 a visible form of legal and social 
penance, have humbled many banks. The social “magic” of regulation, in 
terms of its perceived strength and legitimacy,255 cannot be ignored and 




 250 Credible supervision and enforcement. One important aspect of supervision is stress-
testing that puts banks through hypothetical models of stress scenarios in order to evaluate 
resilience, see IRIS CHIU & JOANNA WILSON, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, CHAPTER 9.F 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019). 
 251 The financial regulatory paradigm has shifted away from market fundamentalism with 
the advent of macro-prudential regulation, see Iris H-Y Chiu, Macro-Prudential 
Supervision: Critically Examining the Developments in the UK, EU and Internationally, 6 L. 
& FIN. MKT. REV. 184 (2012), toward supervisory measures such as stress-testing, see CHIU 
& WILSON, supra note 250, and accompanying text; an explosion of transparency returns, 
see Iris H-Y Chiu, Corporate Reporting and the Accountability of Banks and Financial 
Institutions, in THE LAW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKS 196, 199-215 (Iris H-Y 
Chiu et al. eds., 2015); and extension of regulatory reform to areas hitherto unregulated or 
lightly regulated, such as alternative investment funds, see ANDENAS & CHIU, supra note 
109, at 140-90, and aspects of shadow banking, see RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHADOW 
BANKING: LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS, chapters 3-13 provide discussion on different 
aspects (Iris H-Y Chiu & Iain MacNeil eds., 2017). 
 252 See Christopher Arup, The Global Financial Crisis: Learning from Regulatory and 
Governance Studies, 32 L. & POL’Y 363, 365-72 (2010); Timothy Canova, Financial Market 
Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian 
Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y. REV. 369, 388-93 (2010). 
 253 ANDENAS & CHIU, supra note 244. 
 254 The financial penalties meted out to banks for historical misconduct such as mis-
selling and manipulation of the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate have been tremendous in 
the U.S. as well as U.K. See Hannes Köster & Matthias Pelster, Financial Penalties and 
Bank Performance, 79 J. BANKING & FIN. 57, 59 (2017), (detailing 671 penalties imposed 
following the financial crisis). Köster and Pelster also find, however, that bank performance 
improves thereafter as investors perceive behavioral problems to be closed upon regulatory 
punishment. See id. at 62-70. 
 255 See Augusto de la Torre & Alain Ize, Regulatory Reform: Integrating Paradigms, 13 
INT’L. FIN. 109, 110-12 (2010). Regulation offers appeal in providing a “better” solution 
when self or light regulation has failed. Rosner and Markowitz discuss how voluntary 
initiatives undertaken by firms never went far enough in the US to promote occupational 
health and safety and were ultimately superseded by regulation. See Rosner & Markowitz, 
supra note 16, at 29-34. In cases where the social responsibility concerns are severe, such as 
where commercial activities are carried out in conflict areas experiencing severe human 
rights breaches, self-regulation by firms may be regarded as insufficient, as there is a lack of 
public accountability and the level of social protection required may exceed a firm’s 
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plays a part in restoring social confidence. The re-regulatory high in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis 2007-2009 is an important driver for 
the increased legalization of CSR to change corporate behavior,256 as 
corporate regulation remains an important socio-political tool.257 This is a 
trend not limited to,258 although pronounced in, the EU259 and U.K.260 At an 
international level, a similar appetite for the legalization of CSR can also be 
detected. 261 International initiatives are launched against corporate 
bribery262 and tax evasion,263 while non-governmental activists such as in 
                                                                                                                                      
governance capacity. For example, De Beers developed a system for tracing the source of 
their diamonds in order to ensure that they were not implicated by conflict diamonds (the 
Kimberley Process). However, in the face of mounting international pressure and reports of 
severe human rights breaches regarding the conflict areas in Angola and Sierra Leone, the 
U.S. ultimately passed the Clean Diamonds Trade Act. The Act outlaws trade in diamonds 
not certified according to internationally-agreed standards set out in the Kimberley Process. 
See Andrew Bone, Conflict Diamonds: The De Beers Group and the Kimberley Process, in 
BUSINESS AND SECURITY: PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS IN A NEW SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT 129, 129-35 (Alyson J.K. Bailes & Isabel 128 Frommelt eds., 2004), 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI04BaiFro/SIPRI04BaiFro11.pdf; 
see also Ralf Boscheck, Strategy, Markets and Governance, in STRATEGIES, MARKETS AND 
GOVERNANCE: EXPLORING COMMERCIAL AND REGULATORY AGENDAS, supra note 16, at 5-6. 
 256 Engobo Emeseh et al., Corporations, CSR and Self Regulation: What Lessons from 
the Global Financial Crisis?, 11 GERMAN L.J. 230, 253-59 (2010); Larry Catá Backer, From 
Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of 
Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 591, 601-08 (2008); Corinne Gendron et 
al., Résponsibilité Social et Regulation de l’Entreprise Mondialisée [Social Responsibility 
and the Regulation of the Global Firm], 59 REL. INDUSTRIELLES 73-100 (2004). 
 257 See Gunningham, supra note 15 and accompanying text; PHILIP RAWLINGS ET AL., 
QUEEN MARY U. OF LONDON, CTR. FOR COM. L. STUD., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES: 
AIMS AND METHODS 24-29 (2014), http://www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/media/ccls/docs/research/
020-Report.pdf. 
 258 For example, the U.S. has also enacted regulatory measures related to corporate social 
responsibility, such as in relation to conflict minerals. Listed companies are to report on 
whether they use certain minerals originating from the Democratic Republic of Congo or 
other conflict-ridden country and the extent of due diligence and monitoring they carry out 
to ascertain the source of their minerals, see SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINAL RULE: CONFLICT 
MINERALS (2012), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67716.pdf. The EU counterpart 
is discussed in Section III, infra. 
 259 The EU’s initiatives for legalization of CSR are discussed in Section III, infra. 
 260 See discussion infra Section III. 
 261 See LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS (Christian Brütsch & 
Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007). Brütsch and Lehmkuhl’s volume shows how legalization is 
pursued at a transnational level to deal with common global problems in relation to 
economic activity, such as financial crime and corporate financial reporting. 
 262 See e.g., Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Int’l. Bus. 
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43, OECD/LEGAL/0293 (1998), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf; PREVENTING 
CORPORATE CORRUPTION (Stefano Manacorda et al. eds., 2014). 
 263 See Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. Council, Standard for Automatic Exchange of 
Fin. Acct. Info. in Tax Matters, Jul. 15, 2014, C(2014)81/FINAL; id. at 10 (detailing that the 
convention is modeled on the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, see 26 
U.S.C.A §§ 1471–1474 (West) (Current through P.L. 115-281)); see also Iris H-Y Chiu, 
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human rights have pushed these issues to a level of legalization.264 
In the U.K., the continuing motivation towards legalization of CSR is 
also attributable to the sharpened political need to respond to social 
demand. The persistence of critical CSR265 is not a futile effort, as such 
voices can stimulate paradigm changes in more destabilizing times. 
Political sensitivity is sharpened towards social demand as the U.K. 
continues to experience political disruption that has followed from the 
global financial crisis. Instability in the consolidation of political power 
amongst major parties in the U.K. has intruded upon business-government 
relations, now in a more turbulent phase. 
The New Labour government was ousted from power in the 2010 
election following political mistakes made by the incumbent government 
defending the economic status quo.266 With no party gaining a majority, an 
                                                                                                                                      
From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens 
and Financial Centres in the International Legal Order, 31 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 163, 172-79 
(2016) (discussing the legal endorsement in some EU legislation of the OECD’s Model Tax 
Convention, see OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income & on Capital, Jul. 14, 2014, 
OECD/LEGAL/0407). 
 264 See U.N. HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. HR/Pub/11/04 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/
documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf; see also Larry Catá Backer, 
The Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights at a Crossroads: The State, the 
Enterprise, and the Spectre of a Treaty to Bind Them All 44-49 (Coalition for Peace & 
Ethics, Working Paper No. 7/1, 2014). 
 265 “Critical CSR” refers to academic and intellectual commentary that casts doubt on the 
sufficiency of business-oriented or managerialized forms of CSR, and which raises critical 
questions about connecting to corporations’ moral agency, real behavioral change, and 
corporate culture. See e.g., Martin Fougère & Nikodemus Solitander, Against Corporate 
Responsibility: Critical Reflections on Thinking, Practice, Content 
and Consequences, 16 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 217-227 (2009); Mollie Painter-
Morland, Rethinking Responsible Agency in Corporations: Perspectives from Deleuze and 
Guattari, 101 J. BUS. ETHICS 83-95 (2011). Other commentators also point out that CSR can 
be used to resist deeper social embedment of issues within the corporate structure, such as 
stakeholder voice and involvement, see Gregory Jackson & Androniki Apostolakou, 
Corporate Social Responsibility in Western Europe: An Institutional Mirror or Substitute?, 
94 J. BUS. ETHICS 371, 387-90 (2010); but see Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, “Implicit” and 
“Explicit” CSR: A Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Understanding of Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 404-424, (2008) (adopting a more neutral 
explanation for “explicit” versus “implicit” CSR using the lens of institutional reasons). 
Further critical CSR could refer to business’ attempts to situate the discourse outside of 
political spheres, thereby disempowering constituents and carrying out a form of neo-
colonization of the social discourse, see Jean-Pascal Gond, Reconsidering the Critical 
Corporate Social Responsibility Perspective Through French Pragmatic Sociology: 
Subverting Corporate Do-Gooding for the Common Good?, in THE CORPORATION, supra 
note 123, at 360, 361-68; Steve Tombs, The Functions and Dysfunctions of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, in THE CORPORATION, supra note 123, at 351-56; Baars, supra note 170, at 
427-29. The “social citizenship” literature is arguably also critical as it emphasizes the need 
to re-embed CSR discourse in the political relations between corporations, government and 
society, see supra note 173. 
 266 Justin Pritchard, United Kingdom: The Politics of Government Survival, in FRAMING 
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unprecedented coalition government was formed in the wake of the election 
between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, which oversaw most of 
the immediate post-crisis reforms and a period of severe austerity measures. 
Social sentiment has remained unstable as greater polarization between the 
political right and left grew,267 and far-right elements have garnered a 
louder voice in political representation.268 The subsequent Conservative-
majority governments269 have been weak and besieged by divisions in 
social demand and opinions. The U.K. is experiencing a period of political 
instability as highlighted in the highly divided Brexit referendum in 2016 
and its continuing ramifications. Social discontent leading to political 
disruption is also played out in the U.K.’s European neighbors. Such 
political disruption is a response to the social fallout from austerity 
measures,270 and some of which reflect a social cry for a paradigm shift and 
change in policy.271 
In this landscape, holders of political power (potentially transient in 
these destabilizing times) have turned to regulation272 to address many 
aspects of social discontent, especially vis-a-vis business. Such socially-
facing regulation of business could placate voters, but they inevitably cause 
a shift in business-government relations. Could the current wave of 
legalization in CSR matters signal a fundamental institutional shift in the 
tenets of regulatory capitalism, bridging the economically-driven and 
market-focused corporation with its ethical and social dimensions? Has the 
new legalization ultimately “hardened” the soft law of socially-driven 
initiatives? We analyze the key reforms to critically appraise their 
achievements and limitations. We suggest marginal shifts have occurred but 
                                                                                                                                      
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN 99-119 (Paul ‘t Hart & Karen Tindall eds., 2009). 
 267 Such as the election of extreme left Jeremy Corbyn as Labour party leader, while 
nationalist elements in the Conservative Party became bolder and were instrumental in 
aligning with far-right political parties supporting the U.K.’s “Brexit” from EU membership. 
The Conservative government ultimately offered a referendum in May 2016, which resulted 
in the shocking, narrow majority supporting Brexit. The Liberal Democrats, recognized as a 
centrist party, were trounced in the 2015 elections, losing over 30 seats in Parliament. 
 268 Characterized by the rise of the U.K. Independence Party led for a time by 
charismatic Nigel Farage. 
 269 The Cameron government in 2015 and the May government formed in late 2016 after 
the Brexit Referendum. 
 270 Such as social unrest and protests in Portugal, Greece and Spain, as austerity 
measures adversely affected social welfare. 
 271 The French election in 2016 that saw a completely new party and leader Emmanuel 
Macron defeat well-established left and right parties; and the rise of far-right politics in 
Hungary and Poland, and also reflected in the gains made by far right political parties in the 
German and Austrian elections in 2017. The Spanish Catalan separatist movement, although 
quashed in mid-2017, also highlighted elements of political volatility in Spain. 
 272 Analyzed for e.g. in relation to the EU regulatory machinery as a harmonizing and 
also politically stabilizing force, see Tully Fletcher, The European Union: From Impotence 
to Opportunity?, in FRAMING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, supra note 266, at 181–
200. 
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new governance techniques employed in regulatory reforms leave 
flexibility for ambivalent implementation. We account for the 
underwhelming achievements but show how their limitations have been 
dependent on the characteristics of the U.K.’s regulatory capitalism. 
Fundamentally, regulatory capitalism is defined by the capitalist model in 
which it is implemented. 
Section III highlights the precise locations of institutional weaknesses 
in order to provoke thinking for a change and suggests that regulatory 
leadership can still play a crucial role in institutional change. 
III. POST-CRISIS LEGALIZATION OF CSR 
The corporate regulation reforms discussed in this Section could mark 
a significant institutional shift, as various socially-facing aspects of 
corporate behavior seem no longer to be left in the realm of soft law and 
self-regulation, but have found a place in regulatory law. This, however, 
does not mean that regulatory law embodies the substantive norms of 
conduct, or implementation and enforcement that reflect the nature of social 
demand. Crucially, new governance techniques have again been brought in 
to effect such reforms. On the one hand, new governance techniques 
embody a new ethos in corporations’ governance relationships with 
stakeholders and not just the regulator/state. The employment of such 
techniques could mark a shift towards changing the nature of corporate 
regulation, allowing multi-stakeholderism and more social infusion into 
corporate regulation. On the other hand, new governance techniques can 
also empower internal self-regulation by corporations, and are susceptible 
to devolution to corporates without due monitoring and accountability, as 
has occurred in the pre-crisis years. We observe that new governance 
techniques have been employed in two key ways across a number of 
different regulatory reforms. 
One technique extends corporate transparency to socially-facing issues 
and seems to invigorate securities markets as well as broader society in new 
roles of governance. We discuss the examples of the EU Non-financial 
disclosure Directive 2014 and the U.K.’s Modern Slavery Act 2015. The 
other technique employs the new governance approach of interrogating the 
inside of a corporation to enhance responsibility for preventing misconduct. 
These are in relation to conflict minerals due diligence (EU Conflict 
Minerals Regulation 2017), bribery (Bribery Act 2010), tax evasion 
(Criminal Finances Act 2017), and the general enhancement of stakeholder 
voice in corporations (the U.K.’s Business Energy and Industrial Strategy 
(BEIS) Department’s reforms). 
The achievements and limitations of recent corporate regulation 
reforms will be fleshed out by our analysis of the advancements (or 
otherwise) made by the employment of new governance techniques. New 
governance has the potential to challenge the economic insularity of 
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corporate governance and objectives, and compel a form of socialization of 
the corporation. However, the very flexibility and malleability of new 
governance techniques can be molded to limit their challenge to the tenets 
of regulatory capitalism. We argue that “strong” forms of implementation 
of certain corporate regulation reforms could be adopted that bring about 
more profound paradigm shifts corporate regulation in the U.K., but these 
are ultimately not achieved. Instead, the implementation in the U.K. 
continues to be shaped by the tenets of regulatory capitalism. 
A. Strong versus Weak Forms of New Governance Implementation 
Strong forms of implementation of the recent corporate regulation 
reforms can signal decisive shifts away from the tenets of regulatory 
capitalism. Such implementation could promote the ethos of new 
governance techniques in terms of infusing corporate objectives and culture 
with social and ethical underpinnings, and promoting greater engagement 
between corporations with stakeholders in various degrees of formalized 
multi-stakeholder approaches in securing corporate compliance.273 These 
shifts would represent the change from the market fundamentalist 
paradigms of corporate behavior, as actors in governance could be non-
market in nature, and social values may be elevated and not marginalized 
by market values. We regard one or more of the following as representing a 
marked shift in corporate behavior: re-orienting corporate objectives 
towards commitment to address the CSR problems, re-orienting internal 
management and structures towards new ethics for supporting social 
objectives, re-positioning corporate accountability towards a wide scope of 
the polycentric sphere, and the adoption of new, collaborative or pluralistic 
                                                          
 273 Multi-stakeholder initiatives can come in a variety of forms and hence impacting on 
their effectiveness, as participation scope, meaning and intensity of participation, quality of 
deliberativeness, procedural governance in the multi-stakeholder structure and ultimately, 
consequentiality can differ vastly among initiatives. These problems are pointed out by 
Karin Backstränd, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Rethinking 
Legitimacy, Accountability and Effectiveness, 16 EUR. ENV’T 290-306 (2006); Luc Fransen 
& Ans Kolk, Global Rule-Setting for Business: A Critical Analysis of Multi-Stakeholder 
Standards, 14 ORG. 667-684 (2007); Greetje Schouten et al., On the Deliberative Capacity 
of Private Multi-Stakeholder Governance: The Roundtables on Responsible Soy and 
Sustainable Palm Oil, 83 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 42-50 (2012); O’Rourke, supra note 177, at 1-
29; but the highlighting of these issues can be a start towards their improvement. Particular 
issues in relation to certain major multi-stakeholder initiatives are discussed, in relation to 
the Ethical Trading Initiative, see Susanne Schaller, The Democratic Legitimacy of Private 
Governance, INEF REPORT 91/2007, Oct. 2007, at 5-45; in relation to the Forest Stewardship 
Council, see Axel Marx & Dieter Cuypers, Forest Certification as a Global Environmental 
Governance Tool: What is the Macro-Effectiveness of the Forest Stewardship Council?, 4 
REG. & GOVERNANCE 408-434 (2010); in relation to the Marine Stewardship Council, see 
Lars H. Galbrundsen, The Emergence and Effectiveness of the Marine Stewardship Council, 
33 MARINE POL’Y 654-660, (2009). More mature multi-stakeholder initiatives that have 
achieved some successes in input and output legitimacy in different degrees, is discussed in 
Vallejo & Hauselmann, supra note 190, at 3-26. 
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techniques of governance by the corporation. 
On the contrary, weak forms of implementation would likely result in 
little difference from the tenets of regulatory capitalism. This could mean a 
continued subscription to the importance of incentives-based behavior and 
market discipline, and limited or non-adoption of multi-stakeholderism. 
Further, new governance techniques that interrogate internal management 
structures, governance or procedures can be devolved to corporations and 
reduced to proceduralization. Corporations can superficially adopt 
procedures or manipulate them for instrumental purposes, culminating in a 
form of “organized hypocrisy”274 that does not touch corporate culture.275 It 
has been observed that the deliberate promotion of multi-stakeholder 
governance in environmental governance has been unique and successful, a 
trend not replicated in other areas of CSR. 276 Corporations devolved to 
interpret new governance reforms may manipulate regulatory freedoms in a 
calculative manner that does not satisfy social expectations,277 undermining 
the ethos of new governance itself. At worst, corporations can even subvert 
the original cause to change corporate behavior as they can become more 
politically involved in order to influence policy.278 
B. Examples 
We first discuss the employment of new governance techniques in 
interrogating internal management and procedures at corporations to 
combat bribery and tax evasion. Next, we discuss the use of the same 
techniques, albeit in a more limited way, in addressing supply chain 
governance by corporations. Third, we turn to reforms based on corporate 
disclosure of CSR issues. Finally, we discuss the U.K.’s reforms to improve 
stakeholder engagement with companies. 
1. Enhancing Internal Interrogation into Corporations and Changing 
Corporate Culture? 
We first examine the Bribery Act 2010 and Criminal Finances Act 
                                                          
 274 Dangers are also canvassed in Parker, supra note 219, at 207-37; Kimberly Krawiec, 
Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487-
544 (2003); Alwyn Lim & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Globalization and Commitment in Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Cross-National Analyses of Institutional and Political-Economy 
Effects, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 69-98 (2012) (on “organized hypocrisy” and ceremonial 
commitment). 
 275 Tombs, supra note 265, at 347-59. 
 276 Arya & Salk, supra note 177, at 211-234. 
 277 Discussed in Section II. 
 278 Gary Fooks et al., The Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility: Techniques of 
Neutralization, Stakeholder Management and Political CSR, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS 283-299 
(2013); Ben Baumberg Geiger & Valentina Cuzzocrea, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Conflicts of Interest in the Alcohol and Gambling Industries: A Post-Political Discourse?, 
68 BRITISH J. SOC. 254-272 (2017). 
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2017 to assess the U.K.’s legislative efforts intervening into the internal 
organization of corporations in order to change corporate behavior “from 
within.” Under both pieces of legislation, corporations are obliged to 
institute reasonable or adequate procedures in order to prevent bribery or 
tax evasion. This form of ex ante phrasing is different from ex post 
enforcement against acts of bribery and tax evasion. The obligation to 
prevent emphasizes ongoing efforts and is aimed to change “the way things 
are done” in the corporation via the introduction of a form of procedural 
regulation. 
The Bribery Act 2010 introduces criminal liability for a corporation 
that fails to prevent bribery by any person associated with it in order to 
retain business or gain an advantage for the corporation.279 The corporation 
can only avoid liability if it has in place adequate procedures280 designed to 
prevent such conduct. Anti-bribery regulation delineates corporations’ 
responsibility to prevent bribery even if they operate in a complex web of 
external institutional and cultural factors that drive demand-side pressures 
for corruption.281 The Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduces for 
corporations an offense for failure to prevent tax evasion facilitated by a 
person associated with the corporation, whether such tax evasion is in 
relation to a liability to pay U.K. or foreign tax.282 The corporation can only 
avoid liability if it has put in place prevention procedures that are 
reasonable to be instituted. It is arguably a bold step for both Acts to 
impose criminal liability on corporations for “failure to prevent,” signaling 
the need for corporations to proactively look into their internal 
organizations, procedures, and incentives in order to avoid liability. 
In terms of substantive norms, anti-bribery norms have been enhanced 
in the Bribery Act while anti-tax evasion norms have been incrementally 
developed in other pieces of legislation.283 The Bribery Act has adopted an 
                                                          
 279 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (UK). 
 280 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE 15-20 (2010), 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf (provides 
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 281 Firms can find demand side pressures difficult to handle if they are reliant on corrupt 
host country governments e.g. for exporting rights, licenses, public infrastructure, or just the 
overwhelming cultural or institutional factors in host countries, see S. Douglas Beets, 
Understanding the Demand-Side Issues of International Corruption, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 65-
81 (2005); Yanjing Chen et al., Factors Influencing the Incidence of Bribery Payouts by 
Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 231-244 (2008); Kelly D. Martin et al., 
Deciding to Bribe: A Cross-Level Analysis of Firm and Home Country Influences on Bribery 
Activity, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1401-1422 (2007); Simon Gächter & Jonathan F. Schulz, 
Intrinsic Honesty and the Prevalence of Rule Violations Across Societies, 531 NATURE 496-
499 (2016). 
 282 Criminal Finances Act 2017, c. 22, § 45–46 (UK). 
 283 The Finance Act 2013 introducing an anti-abuse rule and the EU Tax Avoidance 
Directive that has been passed in July 2016 but has yet to be implemented in most EU 
countries, see Council Directive 2016/1164, 2016 O.J. (L 193) Arts 4-9, esp. Art 6 (EU). 
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expansive definition of bribery,284 avoiding the route taken by the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act whose exceptions to the definition of bribery 
reflect the capture of business interests.285 The Act has arguably achieved 
an unequivocal pronouncement on the social unacceptability of bribery286 
after a protracted policy process challenged by business resistance.287 Under 
the Criminal Finances Act, tax evasion is defined as “cheating the public 
revenue” or “knowingly engaged in a fraudulent scheme to evade tax”288 
and in relation to foreign taxes, relates to committing a tax evasion offence 
or breach of duty under foreign law.289 The illegal tax behavior captured 
relates to well-established norms of tax evasion behavior such as deceptive 
under-declaration or falsification of information so that tax liability is 
assessed incorrectly, but will also include tax avoidance behavior that is 
established as “abusive.” As Wolff points out,290 there is relatively minimal 
tax evasion by corporations as such, especially by multinational 
corporations whose financial transparency is heavily regulated, leaving 
little room for tax evasion behavior.291 The increasing social outcry against 
corporate tax behavior relates to tax avoidance292 or aggressive forms of it, 
                                                          
 284 Christopher J. Newman & Michael Macaulay, Placebos or Panaceas: Anglo-New 
Zealand Experiences of Legislative Approaches to Combatting Bribery, 77 J. CRIM. L. 482-
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 286 Laura S. Underkuffler, Defining Corruption: Implications for Action, in CORRUPTION, 
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2015/03/lc248_Legislating_the_Criminal_Code_Corruption.pdf, but there was no legislative 
resolve towards the end of the Major government. Indeed, the ultimate enactment of the 
Bribery Act 2010 reflects protracted and oft-criticized progress. See LAW COMM’N, 
REFORMING BRIBERY at 5-14 (2008), https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-
storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015/04/lc313.pdf. Discussed in Cecily Rose, The UK 
Bribery Act 2010 and Accompanying Guidance: Belated Implementation of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 485-499 (2012). 
 288 Criminal Finances Act 2017, c. 22, § 45 (UK). 
 289 Id. at § 46. 
 290 Lutz-Christian Wolff, Offshore Holdings for Global Investments of Multinational 
Enterprises: Just 
Evil?, 6 J. BUS. L. 445-471 (2015). 
 291 Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 25-48 (2007). 
 292 See difference between avoidance and evasion explained in Montgomery Agnell, Tax 
Evasion and Tax Avoidance, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 80-97 (1938). Aggressive MNC tax 
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i.e., legal structures and schemes that may appear to be complex and 
contrived, in order to minimize a corporation’s tax burdens. 
Commentators have discussed how globalization and easy access to 
low tax jurisdictions have greatly facilitated tax avoidance schemes – such 
as the use of transfer pricing schemes within the same group of companies 
293or the use of offshore companies incorporated in tax havens to hold 
corporate assets or licenses so that revenues are regarded to be earned 
offshore and subject to minimal tax. 294 One of the most oft-cited examples 
is the “double Irish Dutch sandwich” scheme used by Google to avoid 
paying corporate tax in the U.S.295 Although the ethicality of paying tax is 
not an absolute one,296 and one can take the view that tax laws are rule-
based in nature,297 not representing fundamental norms or values such as 
the protection of human rights or anti-corruption,298 the social outcry 
against aggressive corporate tax avoidance, especially by globally 
successful companies, is not unfounded. Zucman299 argues that aggressive 
corporate tax avoidance has to date deprived most treasuries of 20% of their 
corporate tax receipts, which form a third of most developed jurisdictions’ 
revenues. Even if the net effect is a 6% loss or so in overall tax receipts by 
governments, this can impact public services, the deterioration of which is a 
major source of social discontent. 300 Further, the loss of tax receipts could 
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mean that governments have to borrow more and spread the cost of 
borrowing onto ordinary citizens, with the perception of such burdens 
worsening in times of austerity. Although some have argued that 
corporations, especially multinational ones, do not benefit much from state 
provision of services or welfare and hence should not be asked to pay taxes 
to fund state expenditure,301 this argument only reflects the insularity of the 
economically-driven, globalized corporation that has no sense of citizenship 
or common burden-sharing with its communities.302 Many commentators 
see the need for corporations to be responsible in the ethicalities of their tax 
behaviors, especially in light of their resourcefulness compared to ordinary 
individuals.303 
Tax behavior has come under substantive reform since 2013. Until the 
passage of the Finance Act 2013, there was no “general anti-avoidance 
rule”304 in the U.K. In 2013, tax law has been reformed to allow Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to challenge “tax abuse” 
arrangements.305 Where the HMRC is of the view that tax abuse 
arrangements are in place, it needs to establish their nature by referring to a 
panel whose advisory opinion is recognized in court.306 Abusive tax 
behavior is based on a “double reasonableness” test that no reasonable 
person would regard the arrangement as a reasonable course of action, 
except to facilitate tax avoidance.307 The tax abuse regime applies to 
specific taxes including corporation tax,308 and HMRC publishes regularly 
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 307 Finance Act 2013, c. 29, § 207(2). 
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specific schemes under the “spotlight” that it would challenge as tax abuse. 
These tend to be highly specific instances of unacceptable avoidance of tax 
or claiming of relief. Hence, establishing that any tax avoidance scheme is 
abusive or evasionist requires the exhaustion of due process and tends to 
result in findings of a highly specific nature. Although a major step towards 
a general anti-avoidance rule, some commentators argue that the U.K.’s 
approach falls slightly short.309 However, the EU Anti-Avoidance Directive 
2016, which has yet to be fully implemented by Member States, clearly 
combats many instances of corporate tax avoidance and provides a general 
anti-avoidance rule. The Directive looks set to develop substantive norms in 
unacceptable tax behavior more widely in an unprecedented manner.310 Full 
implementation in the U.K. is however uncertain given Brexit’s 
imminence.311 In sum, there is a movement towards reforming tax behavior 
norms but the full extent of these achievements remains to be seen. It is 
noted that the U.K. has also introduced soft measures to moderate 
corporations’ behavior,312 flanking the enforcement regime for abuse. 
Although key achievements in norm advancement have been attained 
in anti-bribery and anti-tax evasion, changes in corporate culture need to be 
achieved by both robust enforcement and ex ante corporate internalization. 
As enforcement is largely ex post and specific in nature, the ex ante role of 
an obligation to prevent is important to instill the need for corporate 
behavioral change. We critically query whether the new governance 
techniques that impose on firms the “responsibility to prevent” would result 
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in mere devolution to corporations to institute internal procedures that are 
opaque to stakeholder and public accountability. This could undermine the 
ethos and potential of new governance techniques, rendering the obligation 
to “prevent” merely rhetoric, as the only meaningful source of pressure for 
behavioral change would be ex post enforcement, which can be more 
sporadic in nature. 
First, we observe that the obligation to institute procedures under both 
Acts would be in accordance with broad guidelines issued by the relevant 
government departments. The Ministry of Justice has issued procedural 
guidance: six broad principles to supplement the Bribery Act.313 A similar 
approach of Ministerial guidance is adopted in relation to the Criminal 
Finances Act. As such guidances outline broad principles, it may be argued 
that corporations can use these as bases for designing tailor-made changes 
to corporate operations or procedures, reflecting changes in corporate 
culture and objectives. However, procedural or organizational reforms 
penetrate at different levels and need not show fundamental change. The 
resolve to change could reflect the corporation’s incentives to manage the 
commercial impact and cost-effectiveness of compliance, or could reflect a 
more normative embrace of social and public interest expectations. The 
premise for change affects the design of procedures including reforming 
leadership commitment, key business and operations processes, risk 
management, and internal control. 314 Procedural changes can also be less 
penetrative and more superficial, if designed merely to minimize legal risk 
while avoiding significant changes to the way business is carried out. 
Procedural changes can be task-oriented such as multiplying documented 
channels,315 and one could remain skeptical as to real engagement with 
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ethics, values,316 or organizational culture.317 Worse, it is queried if broadly-
framed guidances would be able to combat creative compliance318 where 
governance structures can be used to further illicit behavior while appearing 
compliant. It is queried whether corporations can now legitimately 
disengage corporate tax planning (or avoidance) from the specific problem 
of evasion, and direct prevention procedures only narrowly to prevent tax 
evasion. In this case, corporate tax planning can be validly and separately 
carried on as a business-based and not as a compliance-based activity. 
The Acts seem to have devolved to corporations to determine their 
internal organization and reform of procedures, as corporations are only 
required to introduce procedures where “reasonable” and remain the judges 
of “reasonable” on an ex ante basis (although they have the burden to prove 
that their determination was correct). Although the Acts employ new 
governance techniques, the essential new governance ethos of enrolling 
multi-stakeholder input and scrutiny is not implemented. 319 Leaving 
corporations to implement their new compliance may render such post-
crisis new governance techniques susceptible to the pre-crisis problems 
discussed in Section II. LeBaron and Rühmkorf320 in an empirical study of 
the Bribery Act 2010’s implementation found that many corporations have 
visibly changed their internal procedures as well as the terms and manners 
in which they conduct external relationships. These findings show that the 
potential criminal liability that can entail from the Act has compelled an 
extent of disruptive change from the “inside.” However, as this study did 
not engage interviews or qualitative findings of that nature, it does not shed 
light on whether procedural changes in written policies have deeply 
penetrated corporate culture and ethics. 
The U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office’s (SFO) enforcement of the Bribery 
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Act against Rolls Royce PLC in 2017 also sheds light on the extent to 
which new governance regulatory techniques have really changed the 
nature of corporate regulation. In order to avoid prosecution for bribery 
carried out in China, Indonesia, and a number of other countries, Rolls 
Royce agreed to appoint Lord Gold to monitor its internal procedural 
reform to prevent bribery in the future. Such monitoring and review is 
reported periodically to the SFO.321 We argue that the deferred prosecution 
agreement shows a preference for devolution to corporations to institute 
appropriate procedures, subject to a privatized form of monitoring by an 
expert. There seems no attempt made at employing more inclusive forms of 
multi-stakeholder governance to monitor changes at Rolls Royce. 
Privatized implementation of corporate compliance can result in “legal 
endogeneity,”322 the self-legitimating effect of corporations’ 
implementation of their own procedures and systems, resulting in de facto 
self-regulation. Under such an approach, the methods corporations use to 
deal with their ethical and compliance dilemmas remain opaque. In the 
wider context of global competition and temptations from tax havens or the 
difficult contexts of doing business where demand-side pressures for 
corruption abound in foreign jurisdictions,323 ethical dilemmas abound324 
and there is social interest in ensuring that corporate decisions do not 
compromise social objectives.325 The new governance approach in the 
Bribery Act as enforced by the SFO has framed the governance space as 
revolving around the regulator and regulated, leaving little space for public 
and stakeholder scrutiny. We critically question why multi-stakeholder 
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governance is not attempted. For example, Transparency International has 
developed a checklist that systematically directs companies to establish 
policies and management processes that would meet the broadly worded 
procedural requirements in the Bribery Act and MOJ Guidance. 326 Such a 
player could usefully act as part of an independent monitoring group for 
deferred prosecution arrangements.327 Multi-stakeholder governance may 
be resisted by business on the basis of commercial sensitivity, but 
obligations of confidentiality and other safeguards can be imposed.328 
It may, however, be argued that multi-stakeholder governance is not 
the only means of securing corporate behavioral change. There is a strong 
movement in the U.K. towards securing corporate culture and behavior 
change in the banking sector after the global financial crisis 2007-9,329 and 
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expected to take to avoid the contravention occurring, S66A(5) and 66B(5) of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 amended by the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 
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these efforts are very much aimed at empowering regulators against the 
regulated, not co-opting a wider scope of governance capacity. Regulatory 
enforcement and scrutiny can prevent legal endogeneity. However, the 
opacity in the regulator-regulated relationship can make regulatory efficacy 
an inscrutable matter, including obscuring any dangerous elements of 
regulatory capture or sympathy330 for the industry. For example, Wells331 
has criticized the Serious Fraud Office in its forbearance from enforcement 
where it felt constrained by fears that sanctions would damage the firm’s 
viability.332 Further, the unique approach in financial regulation can 
partially be explained by the technical (and quantitative) nature of 
regulatory obligations333 imposed, which stakeholders may find hard to 
scrutinise. We argue that where social objectives underpin corporate 
regulation such as in anti-bribery, multi-stakeholder governance,334 such as 
enrolling a panel of third-party bodies for engagement, feedback or even 
inspections, should be considered, as such can powerfully influence 
corporate consciousness and culture.335 
                                                                                                                                      
2013 and subsequently by the Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016. Second, if 
the regulator is of the view that a senior manager has contravened a conduct rule, 
enforcement may be taken in respect of the senior manager that can culminate in personal 
fines and/or disqualification. Discussion of enforcement can be found in Iris H-Y Chiu, 
Regulatory Duties for Directors in the Financial Services Sector and Directors’ Duties in 
Company Law- Bifurcation and Interfaces, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW 465 (2016). 
https://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/catalogue/productdetails.aspx?productid=30791434 
Further, regulatory interventions have been made to prescribe corporate governance and 
internal control organisation at most financial institutions in order to overhaul their risk and 
control cultures. Basel Committee, Guidelines: Corporate Governance Principles for Banks 
(July 2015); EBA and ESMA, Guidelines on Internal Governance under Directive 
2013/36/EU (Sept. 26, 2017) which applies to banks and investment firms as mirror 
corporate governance provisions are found in the CRD IV and MiFID 2014. PRA Rulebook, 
Compliance, Internal Audit, General Organisational Requirements; FCA Handbook, SYSC 
3, 4, 6 and 7. See discussion in Iris H-Y Chiu, REGULATING (FROM) THE INSIDE: THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL AT BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Oxford: Hart 
2015). The salience of culture to the regulatory agenda is affirmed in Andrew Bailey, 
Culture in financial services – a regulator’s perspective (Speech at Cityweek 2016 
Conference, May 9, 2016) http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/
2016/901.aspx. 
 330 See e.g., Daniel C. Hardy, Regulatory Capture in Banking (IMF Working Paper 2006) 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=892925. 
 331 Celia Wells, Who’s Afraid of the Bribery Act 2010? JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW 420 
(2012) on the lenient enforcement against Innospec and BAE Systems plc. 
 332 Such as the enforcement against Innospec discussed above. 
 333 Such as microprudential regulation which is of a highly technical nature, see 
generally Simon Gleeson, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF BANKING: CAPITAL AND RISK 
REQUIREMENTS (Oxford: OUP 2012). 
 334 Discussed earlier on in Section II as part of the rise of transnational polycentric 
private governance. 
 335 We see increasingly corporate responsiveness to shape ethical cultures in response to 
social and relational demands, as the concept of corporate culture moves away from being 
performance-focused see John Kotter and James Heskett, CORPORATE CULTURE AND 
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2. Addressing Supply Chain Governance in Legislation 
Globalization and international trade have liberalized opportunities for 
the worldwide sourcing, production, and distribution of goods and services, 
but has also brought about opportunities for questionable means of 
economic exploitation of resources and labor. 336 Global sourcing can lead 
to fueling regional conflicts over control of resources like oil and minerals, 
and exploitation of human beings in search of economic opportunities,337 
such as human trafficking and abject labor conditions.338 Whether or not 
corporations are directly complicit in armed gangs’ evil exploits, they have 
been able to take advantage of cost advantages by outsourcing and 
procuring on the basis of their global buying power.339 The abuses in such 
exploitation have been brought to light by the determined efforts of civil 
and non-governmental organizations, highlighting the pernicious effects of 
corporate indifference to the sufferings and negative externalities in their 
supply chains. 
U.K. and EU legislation have now started to address different issues in 
the supply chain, after decades of voluntary and soft law initiatives in the 
transnational polycentric sphere. These are in relation to the importation of 
conflict minerals,340 human trafficking and modern slavery341 (U.K.) and 
                                                                                                                                      
PERFORMANCE (NY: Free Press rep, 2011, from 1991); Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. 
Quinn, DIAGNOSING AND CHANGING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: BASED ON THE COMPETING 
VALUES FRAMEWORK (Chicester: John Wiley & Sons 2011); or efficiency-driven, see 
Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box of “Corporate Culture in Law and 
Economics”, 162 JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS (2006); Eric 
van den Steen, On the Origin of Shared Belief (and Corporate Culture) 41 RAND JOURNAL 
OF ECONOMICS, 617, 617–648 (2010); Rafael Rob and Peter Zemsky, Social Capital, 
Corporate Culture, and Incentive Intensity, 33 RAND J. OF ECONOMICS 243 (2002) (to being 
more socially/relationally-focused). See Marvin T. Brown, Corporate Integrity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2012) at chs 1, 2, 3 and 7; Peter Rea, Alan Kolp, Wendy Ritz 
and Michelle D. Steward, Corporate Ethics Can’t Be Reduced to Compliance, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (April 29, 2016); Christopher McLaverty and Annie McKee, What You Can Do to 
Improve Ethics at Your Company, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 29, 2016); Rosa Chun, What 
Aristotle Can Teach Firms About CSR, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 12, 2016). 
 336 Kate Manzo, Modern Slavery, Global Capitalism & Deproletarianisation in West 
Africa, 32 REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 521 (2005); Kevin Bales, DISPOSABLE 
PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (California: Berkeley University Press, 
1999). 
 337 Chandran Nair, The Developed World Is Missing the Point About Modern Slavery, 
Time.com (June 20 ,2016) http://time.com/4374377/slavery-developed-developing-world-
index-slave-labor/; Kevin Bales, Expendable People: Slavery in the Age of Globalization, 53 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 461 (2000). 
 338 Galit A Sarfarty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARVARD 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 419 (2015). 
 339 Jennifer Bair, The Corporation and the Global Value Chain, THE CORPORATION 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017). 
 340 The EU Conflict Minerals Regulation 2017. 
 341 Modern Slavery Act 2015. 
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more generally, the protection of human rights.342 
New governance techniques are employed in regulatory reforms, but 
they largely devolve supply chain governance to corporations themselves. 
To different extents in the Conflict Minerals Regulation 2017, the U.K. 
Modern Slavery Act 2015, and the non-financial disclosure of human rights 
impact under the EU Non-Financial Disclosure Directive 2014, 
corporations are expected to manage their supply chains based on their 
implementations of “due diligence.” Other than the Conflict Minerals 
Regulation, which imposes direct due diligence obligations, the regulatory 
obligations in the Modern Slavery Act and EU Non-Financial Disclosure 
Directive are disclosure-based, requiring companies to disclose procedural 
aspects of supply chain governance. 
First, it is noted that regulation has avoided articulating particular 
substantive norms, such as liability for sourcing conflict minerals or 
liability for using trafficked labor or modern slaves in the supply chain. 
This is because the regulatory reforms avoid introducing “outcomes” to be 
attained in terms of the social changes that are desired. Introducing bans for 
conflict minerals or substantive norms of such a nature may result in an 
indiscriminate blow to legitimate economic activity in developing regions; 
therefore, the introduction of blanket prohibitions should be avoided for 
unintended consequences.343 Under the Modern Slavery Act, it is a criminal 
offense for anyone to hold or require the performance of slave or 
compulsory labor,344 or to carry out or be complicit in human trafficking.345 
Unless a corporation is engaged in the practice of holding employees to 
egregious slave-like conditions, such as the abusive and illegal employment 
practices at large U.K. sports retailer Sports Direct which became the 
subject of a Parliament Inquiry,346 the criminal offense is unlikely to attach 
to a multinational corporation on the basis of practices occurring in its 
                                                          
 342 UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (2011) which is to be 
implemented by countries in terms of state responsibility for protecting human rights and 
corporate responsibility for preventing and remedying relevant abuses. The EU Non-
financial Disclosure Directive 2014 dealing with the company’s footprint in these matters, 
and only indirectly to its supply chain as a result of the policies it pursues. 
 343 Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129 (2016); 
Katarzyna Kryczka, Sarah Beckers and Tineke Lambooy, The Importance of Due Diligence 
Practices for the Future of Business Practices in Fragile States, 9 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 
125 (2012). 
 344 The nature of such compulsion is widely defined to take into account the individual’s 
circumstances so that not only threats of physical violence would count S1, Modern Slavery 
Act 2015. 
 345 Sections 2-4, Modern Slavery Act 2015. 
 346 House of Commons Business Innovation and Skills Committee, Employment 
Practices at Sports Direct (July 2016) https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201617/cmselect/cmbis/219/219.pdf?utm_source=219&utm_medium=module&utm_cam
paign=modulereports highlighting breaches of minimum wage regulation, employment law, 
and abusive practices. 
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supply chain. There is little prospect of attaching criminal liability to 
corporations for their supply chain practices, or the availability of tort class 
actions by victims of modern slavery in supply chains against the foreign 
multinational.347 It may be argued that corporations maintain different 
levels of leveraging power over their supply chains348 and an excessively 
high level of responsibility may be impracticable, and may indeed damage 
commercial relations and international trade. It seems that soft law and 
transnational governance has achieved far more in terms of introducing 
outcomes-based norms, such as the Ethical Trading Initiative.349 For 
example, the Responsible Business Alliance’s code of conduct for the 
electronics and toys industry sets out extensive norms in terms of achieving 
humane working and employment conditions within the supply chain.350 
Compared to norm advancement in anti-bribery and tax evasion, it is 
questioned why similar norms to prevent the outcomes of suffering for 
individuals, or at least a form of joint or contributory liability for supply 
chain misconduct are not instituted. Such norm changes would have 
profound implications, especially in terms of imposing enterprise liability 
for multinational corporations and changing how they would manage legal 
risk.351 
In terms of the strength in regulating procedures within the firm, the 
Conflict Minerals Regulation352 regime seems most demanding in 
compliance. Detailed due diligence obligations are imposed on importers of 
tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold, and they also need to obtain third-party 
                                                          
 347 There is no doctrine of enterprise liability in the UK see generally Adams v. Cape 
Industries plc 1990] Ch 433; Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34 especially 
Lord Sumption’s judgement with whom two lawlords agree. 
 348 Jennifer Bair, The Corporation and the Global Value Chain, THE CORPORATION 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017) (explaining how some corporations may be 
in a better position to do this than others); see also Erika R. George and Scarlett R. Smith, In 
Good Company: How Corporate Social Responsibility Can Protect Rights and Aid Efforts to 
End Child Sex Trafficking and Modern Slavery, 46 INT. L. AND POLITICS 55 (2013). But see 
Wen-Lin Li, Legal Transplants through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in 
Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 711 (2009) for more nuanced 
and critical discussion on the motivations and effectiveness of such ‘legal transplantation’ of 
codes across supply chains. 
 349 A multi-stakeholder initiative setting out substantive outcomes-based norms such as 
humane labour conditions and fair employment practices, see https://www.ethicaltrade.org/, 
although its achievements have been incremental. See also Susanne Schaller, The 
Democratic Legitimacy of Private Governance : An Analysis of the Ethical Trading 
Initiative http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/3476/pdf/report91.pdf (2007). 
 350 The Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition Code of Conduct at 
http://www.responsiblebusiness.org/media/docs/EICCCodeofConduct5_1_English.pdf. 
 351 See infra Section IV. 
 352 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 17, 
2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, 
tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk 
areas. 
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certification of such compliance. Such due diligence and certification must 
be publicly disclosed on a yearly basis.353 The nature of the obligations is 
highly procedural and prescribed, although the procedures conform to the 
internationally agreed OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chain of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas 
2009. However, these obligations are imposed on a narrow group of direct 
importers of the minerals into the EU.354 If EU corporations produce output 
with these minerals which are sourced at some stage outside of the EU, they 
are not obliged to comply with the Regulation’s requirements.355 
Presumably, they may need to report the human rights impact of their 
activity and their relevant due diligence under the Non-financial Reporting 
Directive. 
The mandatory due diligence obligations under the Conflict Minerals 
Regulation, third-party auditing, and public disclosure go further than the 
disclosure-based and devolved implementation under the Modern Slavery 
Act and the EU Non-financial Disclosure Directive relating to human rights 
in the supply chain, to be discussed below. It is questioned why the 
discrepancy in approach. Nevertheless, in the absence of substantive norms 
that change corporate objectives or conduct, can the fulfilment of due 
diligence improve corporations’ ethical considerations of being good 
citizens in difficult, conflict-ridden, and fragile jurisdictions? It is 
questioned why a more precise substantive norm to require sourcing from 
conflict-free smelters cannot be legalized.356 Would such a norm not have 
greater impact upon the ordering of economic relations in fragile 
jurisdictions? The due diligence obligations in terms of tracing sources and 
undertaking risk management and mitigation are still devolved to 
corporations as a form of contractual management within its supply 
chain.357 In analyzing the American counterpart to the Conflict Minerals 
Regulation,358 commentators observe the practices of weak and cosmetic 
                                                          
 353 Art. 3-7. 
 354 Art. 3-7, see Elif Härkönen, Conflict Minerals in the Corporate Supply Chain, 
forthcoming, 29 European Bus. L. Rev. 691- 727(2018) (discussing the scope of coverage of 
the EU Regulation as affecting about 150,000-200,000 businesses although 880,000 
businesses or so that use conflict minerals at some stage would not be covered.). 
 355 This is unlike the case in the US which requires corporations that use conflict 
minerals in a key part of its production to disclose its sourcing diligence, see Dodd-Frank 
Act 2010 and Conflict Minerals Rule, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240–49. See also SEC Factsheet, 
https://www.sec.gov/opa/Article/2012-2012-163htm---related-materials.html. 
 356 Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129 (2016). 
 357 That said, the EU is developing subsidiary legislation to recognize formally third 
party due diligence schemes. This could go some way in instituting multi-stakeholder 
governance in this area which can promote business-society engagement and accountability 
and could in time bring about stronger substantive norms. 
 358 Which imposes a disclosure obligation on corporations of their steps in due diligence 
if conflict minerals from covered countries are used in the production of an essential 
functionality of their products. 
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due diligence procedures and a general corporate indifference to their 
sourcing and impact on fragile jurisdictions.359 In the absence of stronger 
substantive norms of outcomes or conduct, corporations’ socially-facing 
motivations may conflict with their calculative and bimoral tensions.360 
These underlie the main hazards in devolving to corporations management 
of the socially-facing issues in the commercial context of their supply-chain 
relations. 
There is scope, however, for the third-party certification mechanism to 
work as a form of gate-keeping under the Conflict Minerals Regulation. 
The third-party certification has the potential to hold corporations 
accountable for their due diligence so that superficial compliance is 
avoided. Such certification can count towards highlighting the efforts taken 
by corporations to avoid sourcing for conflict minerals, thereby adding 
implicit pressure for behavioral change.361 There are existing players in the 
industry for such certification services, such as the Conflict-free Smelter 
Programme, which can be expected to gain more formal recognition in 
engaging with mineral importers. It is important that certification should 
not merely be technical in nature and should take into account of the social 
justice footprint of conflict regions and the minerals trade. As the regulation 
comes into force in 2021, the developments under this regulation should be 
watched for the impact on real social outcomes and how business-society 
relations co-evolve. 
In respect to the regulatory obligation of disclosure under the Modern 
Slavery Act and EU Non-Financial Disclosure Directive relating to human 
rights in supply chains, corporations are subject to a principally devolved 
and non-standardized implementation of due diligence. 
Under the Modern Slavery Act, section 54 requires certain commercial 
organizations362 to make annual mandatory disclosures of a “slavery and 
human trafficking statement” (“the Statement”) in order to provide 
transparency on the steps that the corporation has taken to ensure that its 
                                                          
 359 The US disclosure regime has been empirically found to be rather ineffectual, 
producing reports that are not very informative and that do not show deep engagement with 
the ethicality of preventing conflict mineral sourcing. Many companies avoid cost by 
superficially polling suppliers and are content to be rather indifferent in their ignorance of 
ultimate supply sources, see Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information 
Flows, Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 
GOETTINGEN J. OF INT.L L. 129 (2011); Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129 (2016). 
 360 Katarzyna Kryczka, Sarah Beckers and Tineke Lambooy, The Importance of Due 
Diligence Practices for the Future of Business Practices in Fragile States, 9 EUROPEAN 
COMPANY L. 125 (2012). 
 361 However, it may be argued that consumer pressure too must be consistent or else the 
message to corporations may be muted. 
 362 Having a turnover over £36 million net of taxes, as prescribed by section 2, The 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 (Transparency in Supply Chains) Regulations 2015. 
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business and supply chain are free from slavery and human trafficking.363 
The Statement is to be made publicly available on the corporation’s 
website. It is unlikely that section 54 would be interpreted as imposing a 
positive obligation of due diligence. Corporations’ disclosure obligations 
are to account for their own satisfaction that they have prevented the 
occurrence of modern slavery in their supply chains. Further, the mandatory 
statement avoids being too prescriptive as it refers to a non-exhaustive list 
of matters for reporting and companies do not have to include all of them. 
364 
The Home Office’s practical guidance for compliance with reporting 
under the act emphasizes that the Statement should encapsulate the steps 
taken by the company to prevent slavery and human trafficking in its 
business and supply chain, and that it should be in plain English, succinct, 
and readily accessible. As procedural steps in the above list are optional and 
not mandatory, it is unlikely that the Act imposes procedural obligations. 
Corporations are in fact devolved to implement appropriate procedures for 
their own satisfaction of compliance. 
The EU Non-Financial Disclosure Directive 2014 requires large 
undertakings that are public-interest entities (exceeding on their balance 
sheet dates the criterion of the average number of 500 employees during the 
financial year) to include in the management report a non-financial 
statement, where such information forms part of company policies to the 
extent necessary for an understanding of the undertaking’s development, 
performance, position and impact of its activity, relating to, as a 
minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for 
human rights, anti-corruption, and bribery matters. Many of the matters 
in the list relate to the corporation’s own practices, but it is arguable that in 
relation to human rights, the corporation’s role in its supply chain is 
implicated. 
The non-financial statement should include the list of matters below, 
many of which are procedural in nature: 
(a) a brief description of the group’s business model; 
(b) a description of the policies pursued by the group in relation to 
[the social responsibility] matters [mentioned above], including 
due diligence processes implemented; 
(c) the outcome of those policies; 
(d) the principal risks related to those matters linked to the group’s 
                                                          
 363 Modern Slavery Act 2015, § 54. 
 364 The Ministry’s Practical Guidance has clarified the list above as being not 
compulsory, see Home Office, Transparency in Supply Chains etc: A practical guide (2015) 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/471996/
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operations including, where relevant and proportionate, its 
business relationships, products or services which are likely to 
cause adverse impacts in those areas, and how the group 
manages those risks; 
(e) non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the 
particular business.365 
This is transposed in the U.K., which now requires the directors’ 
Strategic Report, i.e. the narrative report produced by the Board, to include 
a non-financial information statement that contains the above 
information.366 It is arguable that the list above, which is mandatory and not 
optional, introduces an indirect form of procedural obligation for 
corporations in relation to instituting effective due diligence procedures and 
measuring social performance.367 This could be a stronger form of supply 
chain governance, compelling real changes in corporations’ relationships 
with their suppliers, and brings the regulatory regime closer to the 
prescriptive one under the Conflict Minerals Regulation. However, we see 
no clear tendency towards treating the mandatory non-financial statement 
as a form of indirect procedural regulation. This is because the Commission 
Communication and the U.K. transposition frame the non-financial 
statement firmly within the familiar tenets of regulatory capitalism, relying 
on investors’ heightened consciousness368 for ESG (environmental, social 
and governance) issues to result in market discipline, a point we return to 
shortly. 
The regulatory techniques above focus on preliminary endeavors such 
as overcoming information asymmetry, and emphasizes a predominantly 
contractual form of management that is private to corporations and their 
suppliers. Such regulatory endeavors pale somewhat against initiatives in 
the transnational governance sphere, which has developed multi-
stakeholder standards and methodology for due diligence, such as third-
party auditing or certification. Some examples are SHIFT-Mazars assurance 
                                                          
 365 Art. 19a. 
 366 Section 414CA, inserted into the Companies Act 2006 via the via the Companies, 
Partnerships and Groups (Accounts and Non-Financial Reporting) Regulations 2016 (S.I. 
2016/1245). 
 367 Iris H-Y Chiu, Unpacking the Reforms in Europe and UK Relating to Mandatory 
Disclosure in Corporate Social Responsibility: Instituting a Hybrid Governance Model to 
Change Corporate Behavior?, 5 EUROPEAN COMPANY L. 193 (2017). 
 368 Such heightened consciousness can be as a result of policy-makers’ nudging towards 
optimal and socially useful shareholder behavior, in ‘shareholder stewardship’ as in the UK, 
see Iris H-Y Chiu, Turning Institutional Investors into “Stewards”- Exploring the Meaning 
and Objectives in “Stewardship” (2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 443-481; or financially-
driven motivations such as the pursuit of investment performance, see Alexander Boersch, 
Doing Good by Investing Well? Pension Funds and Socially Responsible Investment: Results 
of an Expert Survey (January 2010) Allianz Global Investors International Pension Paper No 
1/2010 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1607730. 
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standard for human rights management369 and the SA8000 certification 
standard for fair treatment of workers in workplaces.370 Such voluntary 
initiatives seem to have provided clearer and more precise articulation of 
standards in supply chain governance, such as in the Clean Clothes Model 
Code of Conduct.371 Regulation has clearly avoided hardening substantive 
norms of social justice, and implements a regime to devolve to corporations 
the implementation of appropriate processes. Chuang also points out 
possible retardation in the development of social justice norms more 
generally in relation to labor practices and wage justice.372 Other than the 
OECD guidance for due diligence that has been hardened in the Conflict 
Minerals Regulation, no soft law initiative has attained a harder form of 
recognition. Legalization may even bring about an arguably regressive 
position as corporations are chiefly devolved with supply chain governance 
and subject to weak forms of discipline. 
Indeed, the Practical Guidance from the Home Office for the Modern 
Slavery Act clearly states that mandatory disclosure is not tantamount to a 
warranty by the corporation that such crimes do not occur. This in effect 
sums up the limitations of the disclosure regulation - in the absence of 
norms that deal with conduct or connects more clearly with outcomes, such 
regulatory endeavors bear, at best, a weak connection to the issues of social 
justice sought to be addressed. Disclosure-regulation is means-based 
without definite pursuits of outcomes in relation to social goals such as the 
protection of human rights.373 It is highly questionable if procedural 
compliance proxies for the attainment of satisfactory corporate behavior. 
Procedural obligations such as due diligence would go as far as 
                                                          
 369 SHIFT-Mazars, UNGP Reporting Framework Assurance Guidance and UNGP 
Reporting Framework Assurance Guidance Indicators, https://www.ungpreporting.org/wp-
content/uploads/UNGPRF_AssuranceGuidance.pdf and https://www.ungpreporting.org/wp-
content/uploads/UNGPRF_AssuranceGuidance_Indicators.pdf. 
 370 See Social Accountability International http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
Page.ViewPage&PageID=1689. 
 371 Which has been introduced since 1998, see Clean Clothes Campaign 
https://cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/clean-clothes-campaign-model-code-of-
conduct/view. 
 372 Although this framing establishes a moral basis for clear decrying against modern 
slavery, it may sideline issues such as labour rights and migrant justice, see Janie A Chuang, 
Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law, 108 AMER. J. OF INT. L. 
609 (2014). See also Johannes Koettl, Human Trafficking, Modern Day Slavery and 
Economic Exploitation World Bank Discussion Paper 49802 (May 2009) 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/208471468174880847/pdf/498020NWP0SP0d10
Box341969B01PUBLIC1.pdf. (highlighting the thin line of difference between non-
consensual and consensual forms of exploitation where the exploited party has little choice) 
 373 Ozlem Arikan, Julianne Reinecke, Crawford Spence and Kevin Morrell, Signposts or 
Weathervanes? The Curious Case of Corporate Social Responsibility and Conflict Minerals, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3032498 (2015) (pointing out that legalisation of CSR reforms do 
not address the underlying contested issues of the nature and scope of corporate 
responsibility). 
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improving informational awareness and possibly shapes an organizational 
response. 374 However, how corporations deal with the informational 
awareness or its impact is devolved to them. It is then up to their perception 
of incentives that may motivate any significant conduct change. Both the 
Modern Slavery Act and disclosure regime under the EU Directive involve 
significant devolved implementation by corporations, primarily accountable 
to the markets, and without a mandatory third-party certification or 
assurance. 375 Devolved implementation fails to address any bimoral 
conflicts, opposing incentives and corporate culture that persist in 
corporations. Devolved implementation could even provide a regressive 
form of behavior, legitimating corporate-centered implementation to the 
exclusion of multi-stakeholder governance. 
A brief survey376 conducted of a small sample of Modern Slavery 
Statements in the first year of compliance shows that corporations disclose 
the existence of their internal codes of ethics or conduct and assert that they 
implement due diligence and other procedures developed by themselves in 
order to comply with the disclosure requirements under the Act. The 
corporations surveyed co-opt no multi-stakeholder guidance or partnership 
in fighting modern slavery. Disclosure obligations seem to exert little 
impact upon corporate procedures and behavior, as observed by a couple of 
commentators.377 
Although the EU Non-Financial Directive also facilitates devolved 
implementation, there seems to be more efforts to nudge companies into 
adopting multi-stakeholder developed procedures for due diligence and 
managing the supply chain. The European Commission has developed non-
binding guidelines for supply chain due diligence for three sectors: oil and 
gas, information technology and communications, and recruitment 
agencies, a product of multi-stakeholder governance.378 A comprehensive 
empirical study of the production of narrative reporting in the strategic 
reports by U.K. listed companies finds generally good quality disclosure, 
with the exception of human rights reporting.379 Such a finding highlights 
                                                          
 374 Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35 
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 377 Genevieve LeBaron and Andreas Rühmkorf, Steering CSR Through Home State 
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Global Supply Chain Governance, 8 GLOBAL POLICY 15 (2017). 
 378 Together Against Trafficking in Human Beings, https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
trafficking/publications/european-commission-sector-guides-implementing-un-guiding-
principles-business-and-human_en. 
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corporations’ continued struggles within their supply chain. A model of 
governance centered on mandatory disclosure does not necessarily connect 
with concrete steps forward for strategic or behavioral change, but it 
remains to be seen if the nudge efforts led by the Commission may bear 
fruit.380 This is, however, an incremental process, and guidelines for multi-
stakeholder governance have only been developed for three sectors. 
In sum, the new governance technique of interrogating corporate due 
diligence and other procedures is arguably weak, as it essentially devolves 
to the corporation managing its socially-facing goals within a commercial 
contractual context. This devolution tends to obscure the bimoral dilemmas 
corporations face, which is not made accountable through rather skeletal 
disclosure obligations. Further, the disclosure obligations are purposed 
towards letting markets and stakeholders judge the matter, so corporations’ 
accountability may be framed more narrowly and privately rather than 
being shaped by public interest orientations. 
In relation to the Modern Slavery Statement, although it is of a 
primarily social orientation and not purposed as securities market 
disclosure, civil society scrutiny may be limited. This is because the 
Statement is required to be concise, and the devolved implementation to 
corporations of their procedures may render such implementation 
essentially inscrutable by stakeholders. Civil society also has no standing 
for enforcement, as the Home Office is primarily responsible for 
enforcement. We are skeptical as to the potency of regulatory enforcement 
as the Home Office is tasked with more pressing social and crime 
enforcement responsibilities. It is possible that such enforcement could be 
carried out as part of a criminal enforcement action against a company for 
engaging in modern slavery, but we do not see the Home Office as an 
ongoing supervisor of companies’ procedural systems and governance, or 
perhaps as a watchman for corporate behavioral change. 
In relation to the EU Directive, we are skeptical that investors’ 
governance would become a force for corporate behavioral change towards 
meeting social demands and expectations. We now turn to the limitations of 
CSR transparency that has been framed within the paradigms of securities 
market disclosure. 
3. Corporate Transparency in relation to Social Responsibility Matters 
Corporate transparency in CSR matters has always been regarded as a 
key means to advance corporate engagement with social responsibility. The 
                                                                                                                                      
Study of FTSE 100 Companies https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3049203 (2017). 
 380 The EU’s recommended multi-stakeholder frameworks are arguably not a strong 
version of nudge, which is often implemented as ‘default unless opt out’. There is room to 
consider if such stronger ‘nudge’ is needed, such as to presume adequate disclosure made 
upon the basis of adoption of those frameworks. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN AND 
RICHARD THALER, Nudge (Penguin, 2009). 
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processes of preparing for disclosure could make companies more self-
aware and responsive to social demand and reputational needs.381 Such 
disclosure is also essential for overcoming information asymmetries with 
stakeholders, civil society, and securities markets.382 Voluntary reporting in 
CSR has been on the rise as companies perceive reputational benefits and 
the need to be responsive to investors who care about ESG.383 With the 
growth of the market for voluntary reporting, is there a need for mandatory 
disclosure? The EU Non-Financial Disclosure Directive is situated in an 
ambivalent place - it seems to introduce mandatory disclosure in order to 
improve the accountability of corporate social responsibility relevant to 
non-investor stakeholders, such as consumers. 384 On that basis, mandatory 
disclosure may be explained as necessary in order to overcome the self-
selecting biases of companies, and to represent a shift away from investor-
centric disclosure. This distinguishes the EU Directive’s mandatory non-
financial information statement from other shareholder-centric financial and 
non-financial reporting, which has been introduced in the U.K. since 
2006.385 
                                                          
 381 Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35 
NW. J. OF INT. L. AND BUS. 87 (2014). 
 382 John Parkinson, Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance: 
Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 3 (2003); 
Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information Flows, Regulating Conflict: 
An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 GOETTINGEN J. OF INT. L. 129 
(2011); Björn Fasterling, Development of Norms Through Compliance Disclosure, 106 J. OF 
BUS. ETHICS 73 (2012) (doubting that compelling disclosure causes companies to change 
from within. 
 383 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Standardization in Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting and 
a Universalist Concept of CSR?: A Path Paved with Good Intentions, 22 FL. J. OF INT. L. 361 
(2011). 
 384 Preamble 3 to the EU Non-financial Disclosure Directive 2014. 
 385 The UK has since 2006 required the directors’ business review, a narrative report, to 
contain information on how environment and stakeholder issues relate to business 
performance i.e., the superseded section 417 of the UK Companies Act that deals with 
directors’ business reviews- containing social responsibility matters framed as being useful 
for investors to understand the risks and performance of the company. The former section 
417, Companies Act 2006 has since been superseded by section414A, the Strategic Report, 
discussed in Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the 
Impact of Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 983 (2014). 
The EU has to date extensively harmonised corporate reporting requirements including 
financial and narrative reporting, see Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial 
statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 
2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC. The narrative reporting requirements relate to qualitatively 
explaining business performance and risks, see Arts 19-20, Directive 2013/34/EU above. 
Narrative reporting in the EU and UK has, until the transformational reform introduced in 
the EU Non-financial Disclosure Directive 2014, been focused on shareholder-centric needs 
in relation to evaluating financial performance and viability. See Iris H-Y Chiu, The 
Paradigms for Mandatory Non-Financial Disclosure: A Conceptual Analysis- Parts 1 and 
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The EU Directive has, on face, introduced mandatory disclosure of a 
range of social responsibility matters viz “[an] undertaking’s development, 
performance, position and impact of its activity, relating to, as a 
minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for 
human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.” This prescribed list 
can be perceived as a way of making the disclosure standardized and 
comparable. Commentators have, however, observed that no definite ends 
are articulated with respect to mandatory social disclosure386 (i.e. there is no 
explicit elevation of stakeholders in terms of corporate accountability to 
them, nor is there articulation of particular social goals that corporate 
transparency is to facilitate). Without a clear alternative basis upon which 
mandatory disclosure is to be implemented, such mandatory disclosure has 
to be placed upon its default position, i.e. serving investor-centric purposes 
in securities markets. 
The U.K. transposition of the EU Directive subsumes the non-financial 
statement within the existing paradigms of corporate transparency and 
securities regulation. This approach limits the extent to which the 
mandatory disclosure reforms are fundamentally different in nature from 
the tradition of investor-centric securities regulation. Section 414CA of the 
Companies Act 2006 situates the non-financial statement within the 
directors’ Strategic Report, a narrative report that is centered upon 
explaining financial performance and business risks to investors.387 This is 
not inconsistent with the Directive’s requirement that the non-financial 
statement be included in the management report,388 perhaps highlighting the 
Directive’s ambivalent nature regarding the orientation of the statement. 
The Financial Reporting Council in the U.K. has further clarified that the 
non-financial statement, like the rest of the Strategic Report, should be 
guided by the standard of materiality,389 which frames the nature of 
disclosure according to what may be material to a reasonable investor. 
Although this is again not inconsistent with the Commission 
Communication that provides guidelines for implementation,390 the 
                                                                                                                                      
2,’ 27 COMPANY LAWYER 259; 291 (2006). On the shareholder-centric focus of the section 
417 directors’ report, see Ian Havercroft and Arad Reisberg, Directors’ Duties Under the 
UK Companies Act 2006 and the Impact of the Company’s Operations on the Environment 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1274567 (2010); Andrew Keay, Section 
172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: An Interpretation and Assessment, 28 COMPANY 
LAWYER 106 (2007). 
 386 Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35 
NW. J. OF INT. L. AND BUS. 87 (2014); Barnali Choudhury, Social Disclosure, 13 BERK. BUS. 
L. J. 183 (2015). 
 387 The nature of the Strategic Report is discussed in Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving 
Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the Impact of Corporate Transparency 
Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 983 (2014). 
 388 Art. 19a. 
 389 Financial Reporting Council, Guidance on the Strategic Report (July 2018) 
 390 Section 3.1, Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on non-financial 
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Communication explicitly confirms the stakeholder-orientation of the 
statement.391 One may, however, treat the Communication as having 
ambivalent premises, endorsing shareholder centricity on the one hand by 
referring to standards of materiality, balance and fairness from the 
perspective of investors’ interest, while also referring to corporate 
responsibility conventions and the importance of stakeholders to the 
statement.392 The approach taken by the U.K. in implementing the 
disclosure obligation more clearly limits the social orientation of the 
matters to be reported, and reframes their salience to be investor and 
market-centric. 
Disclosure regulation is often described as “sunlight,” being the “best 
disinfectant” for behavior that may otherwise be hidden and shielded. 
However, it is also a regulatory tool of minimum intrusion as it merely 
compels information to be released so that the market can decide and effect 
necessary economic discipline.393 There is even some investor interest in 
the financial implications of a corporation’s compliance with the Modern 
Slavery Act.394 In relation to socially responsible behavior, the mandatory 
disclosure tool suffers from several limitations. One is that mandatory 
disclosure is addressed to securities markets and investors, and reliance is 
therefore placed on investors to introduce discipline for change in corporate 
behavior. Investors are highly diverse, and even if some groups may 
monitor such disclosure and assess their relevance to their investment 
decisions,395 other groups may be indifferent.396 This results in mixed 
                                                                                                                                      
reporting (methodology for reporting non-financial information) (2017) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017XC0705(01). 
 391 Section 3.5, Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on non-financial 
reporting (methodology for reporting non-financial information) (2017) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017XC0705(01). 
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REV. 537 (2016). 
 393 Alan C. Page and R.B. Ferguson, INVESTOR PROTECTION, at 59-77 (Cambridge: 
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signals and may be overall ineffective in terms of sending a market message 
to corporations. Second, it is not certain what “market discipline” is 
intended to be motivated by mandatory disclosure of this nature. This is 
because investors only play a very limited role in challenging companies in 
matters relating to social responsibility.397 If “market discipline” comes in 
the form of “exit,” this form of economic discipline merely drives corporate 
behavior in relation to managing their social responsibility profile for the 
business case.398 Empirical research has found that social responsibility 
reports focused on the business case tends towards being narrow and 
individualistic, so the investor-centric orientation endorsed in law may not 
be consonant with meeting social expectations.399 
We should not assume that a financially-driven and marketized 
framework for discipline and enforcement would clearly reshape incentives 
and behavioral tendencies on the part of corporations towards socially 
optimal objectives. Further, the reframing of the importance of CSR issues 
as financially-driven may encourage only an instrumental perception of 
their importance. 400 Incentive-based, instrumental behavior can trump 
normative premises401 and the legalization in the EU Directive could 
produce the counter-intuitive effect of undermining the social-ness of the 
CSR norms that corporations should reckon with. However, the opposite 
can also be true. The infusion of the salience of CSR norms into investment 
marketplaces incrementally introduces re-orientation of market perceptions 
with social ones,402 producing an integrative effect which is holistic and can 
                                                                                                                                      
Performance of Firms? (FEEM Working Paper No. 52.2009, 2009), 
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 396 Alan Lewis and Carmen Juravle, Morals, Markets and Sustainable Investments: A 
Qualitative Study of ‘Champions,’ 93 J. OF BU. ETHICS 483 (2010), discussing their findings 
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 397 See Roger M. Barker and Iris H-Y Chiu, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT, ch. 2-3 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2017). 
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 402 See Karl Polyani, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (Beacon Press, 2nd ed, 2002, original 
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overcome the myopic and calculative culture of modern institutional 
investment. This, however, requires more significant institutional change, 
which Strine403 doubts would happen due to the entrenched patterns of 
corporate law and the nature of modern institutional investment.404 The 
U.K. transposition of the ambivalent premises in the EU Directive has 
avoided paradigm change, although some see the usefulness of generally 
overcoming information asymmetries for the purposes of informing civil 
society or stakeholder activism.405 
4. U.K. Reforms towards Stakeholder Inclusiveness in Corporate 
Governance 
The complaint so far of a lack of paradigm change is based on 
observations of the corporate-centric and market-centric premises and 
implementation of recent corporate regulation reforms, signaling no 
significant shift from the tenets of regulatory capitalism. There is, however, 
emerging corporate law reform in the U.K. that holds promise for more 
fundamental change, as the government is preparing to implement more 
formalized stakeholder engagement with corporations. This reform holds 
promise as it places the polycentric governance space around corporations 
on firmer footing, and marks a shift away from the a-socialized corporation 
that pursues shareholder primacy and wealth maximization in a myopic 
manner. If polycentric governance for corporations can be implemented 
“strongly,” this has potential to overcome some of the critique raised earlier 
in relation to the recent reforms. Polycentric governance can become a 
dominant framework in corporate governance that mitigates the weaknesses 
in firm-centric implementation or market-centric disclosure pointed out in 
relation to the reforms discussed above. 
Reforms towards stakeholder inclusiveness are one of the first 
initiatives led by the May government after it came to power in July 2016 to 
reform corporate governance. The Department of Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy has embarked on legislative and soft law reforms that 
purport to recalibrate stakeholders’ relations with the corporate sector in 
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stakeholder favor.406 It may, however, be criticized that most reforms are in 
soft law407 and the legislative initiatives only enhance shareholders’ roles. 
The cynical view is that the reforms resist institutional change by giving 
stakeholders illusory and non-consequential “improvements.” In the 
alternative, we may view the confused premises of these reforms as 
representing a genuine struggle towards institutional change. 
First, employees are the only group of stakeholders given more voice 
in strategic decision-making at companies. This is to be achieved in one of 
three ways: nominating a non-executive director dedicated to employee 
issues, nominating an employee-director, or setting up an employee 
advisory council to feed input to the Board. The Financial Reporting 
Council proposes changes to the U.K. Corporate Governance Code that 
require Boards to demonstrate engagement with stakeholders, and in 
particular to consider the above options in engaging with employees as 
“normally” expected arrangements.408 Code standards are nevertheless 
subject to “comply-or-explain” by listed companies.409 It can be argued that 
the use of market-focused soft law to enhance employees’ stakeholder 
rights within corporate governance falls short of moving away from the a-
socialization of corporations cocooned in the shareholder primacy model. 
The Code is market-focused and is a means for shareholders to hold 
companies’ corporate governance to account. Shareholders could agree to 
companies deviating from these measures if they accept companies’ 
explanations.410 
Next, directors are to report on how they have engaged with 
stakeholder-focused considerations in narrative reporting.411 The disclosure 
requirements are, however, constrained by the nature of the directors’ duty 
                                                          
 406 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance 
Reform: The Government’s Response (August 2017) https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640631/corporate-governance-reform-
government-response.pdf 
 407 As part of the Corporate Governance Code or as industry guidelines, not in company 
law as such. 
 408 FRC, Proposed Revisions to UK Corporate Governance Code (Dec. 2017) 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/bff48ee6-4fce-4593-9768-77914dbf0b86/Proposed-
Revisions-to-the-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-Appendix-A-Dec-2017.pdf. 
 409 Which means that companies should comply with the standards or else explain 
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otherwise with such explanations. 
 410 It has been argued that shareholders tend to hold companies to ‘compliance’ as 
compliance represents a shorthand for best practices and shareholders may be too indifferent 
to evaluate companies’ explanations in detail. See Marc Moore, Whispering Sweet Nothings: 
The Limitations of Informal Conformance in UK Corporate Governance, 9 J. OF CORP. L. 
STUDIES 77 (2009). 
 411 FRC, Proposed Revisions to UK Corporate Governance Code (Dec. 2017) 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/bff48ee6-4fce-4593-9768-77914dbf0b86/Proposed-
Revisions-to-the-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-Appendix-A-Dec-2017.pdf. This is now 
enacted in § 414CZA, Companies Act 2006. 
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in section 172 of the Companies Act,412 which hold directors to account to 
shareholders for how they “promote the long-term success of the 
company.” This directors’ report is primarily intended for shareholders’ 
evaluation. It remains uncertain how the continued maintenance of the 
shareholder primacy focus in such stakeholder-related reporting would 
advance corporate consciousness of stakeholder inclusiveness. There would 
also be development of stakeholder engagement best practices in the form 
of soft law led by professional and industry associations.413 It is uncertain to 
what extent these would include stakeholder input. One of the associations 
involved in developing this soft law is the Investment Association 
representing investors. Can such leadership advance stakeholder 
engagement with companies on stakeholders’ terms? 
Finally, companies are to disclose the pay ratios of their U.K. 
employees.414 This seems, on face, to meet the social demand for 
scrutinizing the gulf of inequalities in reward that have developed in the 
U.K.’s corporate sector. However, such disclosure is primarily targeted at 
shareholders who would scrutinize this as a part of their role in approving 
directors’ remuneration packages. Stakeholders seem disengaged from this 
issue,415 which ought to be of social orientation and importance. 
As soft law, not legalization, has been employed as the premise for 
stakeholders to be “relationized” within corporate governance, the 
continued dominance of the shareholder primacy framework can undermine 
real advancement of stakeholders’ and CSR causes. However, the 
institutional stature of soft law cannot be totally underestimated. Although 
based in soft law, it can be argued that employee stakeholdership must be 
realized, and it is only the form of such realization that is left to companies’ 
                                                          
 412 See §172, Companies Act 2006 explicitly provides that directors’ duties are to 
promote the long-term success of the company for the benefit of the members as a whole. 
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http://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1710014/94-Enlightened_
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Williams, Enlightened Shareholder Value in UK Company Law, 35 UNSW L. J. 360 (2012); 
Andrew Keay, Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: an Interpretation and Assessment, 
28 COMPANY LAWYER 106 (2007); Elaine Lynch, Section 172: A Ground-Breaking Reform 
of Director’s Duties, or the Emperor’s New Clothes?, COMPANY LAWYER 196 (2012). 
 413 Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators: The Governance Institute and 
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 414 Companies Act 2006 ¶ 19A. 
 415 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance 
Reform: The Government’s Response (Aug.2017) https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640631/corporate-governance-reform-
government-response.pdf, showing investor scepticism for the usefulness of such reporting, 
and the lack of stakeholder engagement in responding to this measure. 
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discretion. Further it can be argued that the collaborative model for 
developing other stakeholder engagement mechanisms accepts a 
polycentric principle for developing governance. This makes it less easy to 
exclude civil society and other stakeholder groups that are not specifically 
named in the reform document. Even if the confused and contesting 
premises between shareholder-centric and stakeholder theories of the 
corporation are not reconciled overtly416 in these reforms, these 
developments mark a not insignificant shift from the tenets of regulatory 
capitalism. Space is formally opened up for stakeholders and civil society to 
exert pressure and efforts to ‘re-socialize’ the corporation, and the state has 
finally taken on a more coordinating role to facilitate this potential. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of stakeholder engagement reforms runs 
the risk of being merely proceduralized. Commentators have highlighted 
how stakeholder engagement can be carried out in superficial and limited 
ways and do not fundamentally affect business strategy or corporate 
culture.417 It remains uncertain if implementation of such reforms would be 
devolved largely to the corporation. Further, the domination of investor-
centric input into the development of best practices for stakeholder 
engagement can affect the social utility of these engagement mechanisms. 
The above survey of recent corporate regulation reforms paints a 
mixed picture of what has been achieved in legalizing various aspects of 
CSR. We observe some but not tremendous achievements in advancing 
social norms in relation to corporate objectives or conduct. We observe a 
significant employment of new governance techniques in compelling 
corporations to institute procedures to address CSR matters, but procedural 
regulation is largely devolved to corporations and do not involve the new 
governance ethos of multi-stakeholder governance. Supply chain 
governance in particular, in its devolved nature, is framed within a 
commercial contractual context, and is likely to be dominated by 
commercial and market forces. Finally, we are skeptical that corporate 
transparency empowers multi-stakeholder governance and brings about 
significant impact upon corporate ethical consciousness because such 
transparency is either limited or directed at securities markets whose 
economic discipline, if it exists, is not necessarily aligned with social 
expectations. 
                                                          
 416 Discussed in Ozlem Arikan, Julianne Reinecke, Crawford Spence and Kevin Morrell, 
Signposts or Weathervanes? The Curious Case of Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Conflict Minerals (2015) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3032498. 
 417 Jean-Pascal Gond, Reconsidering the Critical Corporate Social Responsibility 
Perspective through French Pragmatic Sociology: Subverting Corporate Do-Gooding for 
the Common Good’, THE CORPORATION, ch. 23 (Cambridge: CUP 2017) (opining that 
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Bondy, Jeremy Moon and Dirk Matten, An Institution of Corporate Social Responsibility 
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ETHICS 281 (2012). 
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The table below indicates achievements in each regulatory reform that 
may portend of an institutional shift, mapped against limitations that show 
adherence to the institutional tenets of regulatory capitalism. 
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3. Potential devolution 
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In the next Section, we account for why regulatory reforms in 
legalizing aspects of CSR are underwhelming and the implications of 
addressing the precise locations of weakness. 
IV. WHY LEGALIZATION OF CSR IS UNDERWHELMING AND 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Calleiss and Renner argue that418 soft law hardens when its function 
arrives at a state of “stabilization of normative expectations.” We may 
blithely expect the legalization of aspects of CSR to reflect “mature” 
                                                          
 418 Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, From Soft Law to Hard Code: The 
Juridification of Global Governance, 22 RATIO JURIS 260 (2007). 
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moments of recognition for certain aspects of CSR as public goods; the 
“stabilization” of certain socially-facing norms of conduct for corporations; 
and for corporate accountability to be provided in innovative ways, 
including the engagement of multi-stakeholder governance.419 Although the 
flexibility of soft law is often positively regarded, Short argues that “falling 
back” on self or soft regulation is often a manifestation of a regulatory 
“void” – the lack of resolve to address problems.420 Commentators support 
the formalization of public policy in CSR, such as into regulation, as one or 
more of the following benefits can be attained: 
(a) leadership in setting public interest objectives;421 
(b) the orchestration of governance capacity on the part of both public 
and private actors by assigning regulatory responsibilities, 
coordinating a systematic and coherent framework supported by 
regulatory intervention to moderate imbalances in power and 
influence;422 
(c) support for the implementation of changes by private actors. These 
include corporations and third party organisations that may 
propose governance frameworks for corporations. Such support 
allows regulators to co-opt private sector parties into co-
regulation;423 and 
(d) the provision or coordination of enforcement capacity in different 
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and multi-faceted ways in order to secure corporate compliance 
and behavioral change.424 
However, if we measure the achievements of the corporate regulation 
reforms discussed in Section III against the expectations stipulated above, 
the achievements seem underwhelming. 
First, the Table in Section III shows that the articulation of substantive 
obligations is limited, and has only been more clearly achieved in anti-
bribery and anti-tax evasion. In the absence of clearer and stronger 
normative premises, task-based and procedural requirements may produce 
compliance of an underwhelming quality, as corporations can revert to their 
own centricity and market-facing priorities in order to determine their 
implementation. It remains questionable if there is clear engagement with 
ethics, social expectations, and corporate culture. 
The lack of genuine social advancement in some CSR areas may be 
attributed to the still-contested nature of these issues in the polycentric 
transnational sphere.425 The “hardening” or “legalization” of substantive 
norms is limited in two ways. One is that substantive norms that are 
legalized reflect already-achieved consensus in international governmental 
organizations, advancing nothing much that is novel. The due diligence 
obligations in conflict minerals and anti-bribery as well as the fight against 
tax evasion using offshore havens have all been developed extensively over 
decades under the OECD.426 In particular, it may also be noteworthy that 
norm advancement in anti-bribery and tax evasion were achieved due to 
economic interests at play. A number of commentators discuss how U.S. 
business economic interests were key to the U.S. government’s adopting the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 and its sustained championing for 
international convergence, which was finally achieved in the late 1990s at 
the OECD.427 Further, it has also been suggested that anti-tax evasion 
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norms have been advanced in the U.K. after the global financial crisis 
largely due to the government’s interests in shoring up its fiscal weaknesses 
after bailing out large banks in the crisis.428 The alignment of economic 
interests and political strength are key to policy choice changes and norm 
advancement, and such are still relatively lacking in relation to supply chain 
responsibility, as the implications for multinational corporations would be 
an undesirable convergence in enterprise liability and an expansion of their 
legal risks. 429 Hence, in relation to corporations’ responsibility to prevent 
human rights violations or manage supply chain misconduct, norms are 
much more contested in terms of the scope of corporate responsibility in a 
network of commercial relations. 
We also see the lack of advancement in regulatory commitment to 
norms of social justice as being due to the lack of multi-stakeholder 
governance or a Habermasian430 discourse in the polycentric space 
regarding the future of our capitalism model431 and institutions. Although 
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we see new governance techniques employed to an unprecedented extent in 
terms of interrogating the inside organization and procedures of 
corporations, much of regulatory implementation results in devolution to 
the corporation or scrutiny by securities markets. Corporations would 
manage their supply chain governance as an extension to their contractual 
governance, and it is queried if the continued dominance of the commercial 
context would bring any fundamental change to the corporations’ incentive-
based behavior. There is still too much deference to the corporation and its 
self-regulating capacity, and misplaced reliance on capital markets to 
develop an aligned “market for virtue.” The continued failure of regulatory 
incorporation of the new governance ethos of polycentricism could be a key 
impediment to institutional shift. Except for the mandatory requirement of 
third-party auditing under the Conflict Minerals Regulation, there is no 
implicit nudge towards co-opting multi-stakeholder governance in other 
regulatory reforms discussed. 
The lack of advancement in promoting the ethos of multi-stakeholder 
governance can be fundamentally attributed to the incompatibility of such 
governance with the capitalist institution of the U.K.’s liberal market 
economy. This capitalist model eschews the notion of regulators taking a 
lead in coordinating polycentric governance. Orchestrating such 
coordination may be seen to be intervening with the freedoms of 
constituents who should be allowed to express their discipline in the open 
“market for virtue.” Although the “market for virtue” as a liberal notion is 
open to all who supply and demand, the market commercializes virtue, the 
very problem that CSR protagonists wish to address. Moreover, the market 
for virtue is not a level playing field. Voices derived from capital, i.e., 
investors’ voices, are accorded with more legitimacy in the current 
paradigm of regulatory capitalism, and civil society voices can be 
marginalized, enjoying no real freedom of exercising discipline. It may be 
necessary for states and regulators to coordinate stakeholder and civil 
society involvement more explicitly432 in order to (a) signal the public 
interest orientation of CSR issues (and not merely their commercial or 
market relevance) and (b) compensate for stakeholders’ and civil society’s 
relatively disadvantaged positions in exercising governance.433 Pluralistic 
and inclusive frameworks can be key to fostering discourses that may give 
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rise to substantive changes in values, norms or goals.434 
Legalization has also avoided hardening or recognizing civil society 
initiatives that attempt to connect social dimensions with corporate 
procedures, affirming the primacy of the corporation in deciding its 
implementation. This has the tendency to allow corporations to default to 
their incentive-based behavior in designing their implementation. As 
discussed above, despite the achievements in transnational governance435 in 
relation to substantive standards of conduct, auditing, or certification 
initiatives, the regulatory reforms discussed above have avoided 
recognizing these developments. The avoidance of elevating or giving 
recognition to social initiatives may again be attributed to the U.K.’s 
preference for market fundamentalism, allowing corporations to choose 
among the plethora of initiatives out there, as if the transnational 
governance space is a market for implementation designs. One 
commentator opines that more advancement in CSR causes can possibly be 
achieved if regulators are involved in facilitating the coordination and 
convergence of multiple initiatives and standards.436 
In the U.K., the stakeholder-focused reforms in soft law that are afoot 
in corporate governance hold some promise for introducing a formal multi-
stakeholder governance space surrounding corporations. This reform may 
be important for future advancement of CSR causes. Employees are to be 
formally organized in order to input voice into corporate governance, and 
research has shown that they are able to advance labor justice and human 
rights issues.437 Other stakeholder engagement mechanisms are to be 
developed in soft law, and such mechanisms can also form the basis for 
developing multi-stakeholder governance over CSR issues. However, there 
are a few caveats in viewing such stakeholder inclusiveness reforms as 
being equivalent to the coordination of polycentric/multi-stakeholder 
governance in CSR issues. Stakeholder engagement mechanisms are likely 
focused on each group’s interests and may not be focused on particular 
CSR issues. Such engagement mechanisms may be seen as private 
dialogues and communications, and do not revolve around public interest or 
the provision of public goods. In the absence of the “public” coordinating 
hand, the dynamics and coordination within such mechanisms would 
merely be private interactions, and governance potential or capacity may 
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not be activated or galvanized. Much more refinement and formalization of 
stakeholder inclusiveness mechanisms, purposed towards specific CSR 
issues, would need to be considered. 
It may be argued that civil society groups should also improve their 
transparency, social accountability, representativeness and legitimacy in 
order to become truly credible actors in the multi-stakeholder governance 
space. These issues are acknowledged by many,438 but the imperfections of 
such groups can be worked upon. Civil society groups may be comparably 
lacking in capacity, resources, and sophistication vis-a-vis corporations and 
their industry associations.439 Indeed, states and regulators should engage 
with civil society groups more and look into capacity-building in terms of 
their research and informational strengths. Such imperfections cannot 
amount to good reason for their marginalization. 
Corporate regulation reforms in legalizing aspects of CSR seemed to 
hold promise in changing the nature of corporate regulation. We 
acknowledge the incremental achievements but remain underwhelmed. We 
account for the limitations in recent regulatory reforms by highlighting their 
institutional adherence. The institutional account of recent corporate 
regulation reforms within the paradigm of regulatory capitalism explains 
the limited achievements in the implementation of new governance and the 
purported legalization of CSR. This institutional account nevertheless 
pinpoints precise locations of impediments to institutional change, so as to 
inspire resolve to face the heavier lifting ahead. 
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